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INTRODUCTION 
Carbon pricing: a state project 
 
Carbon pricing has emerged as the dominant response of nation-states to the 
climate crisis.  World Bank estimates show 7 per cent of global emissions are 
covered by an actual or scheduled carbon price (ECOFYS 2013, p. 12).  This 
figure will rise to more than 50 per cent if China, Brazil and Chile adopt a 
carbon price, something their governments are considering (ECOFYS 2013, p. 
12).  It is widely expected that China will have a carbon price by 2020 
(Nicholson 2013).  The International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are 
strengthening encouragement for the world’s finance and climate ministers to 
put a price on carbon (‘Global push for carbon pricing grows’ 2013).  The Stern 
Review on the Economics of Climate Change, an international manifesto for state 
policy on climate change, says it is an urgent priority to develop compatible 
carbon prices across the globe (Stern 2006, p. xxiii).  In Australia, a carbon price 
has been operational since 1 July 2012.  The experiment is likely to be short-
lived, given the promise of the recently elected Coalition government to repeal 
the policy.  But it is worth remembering that carbon pricing has been on the 
national agenda for over a quarter of a century, and has been the policy of both 
major parties at different times (Burgmann & Baer 2012, p. 102).   
 
This thesis applies the insights of Marxist state-theory to the development of 
carbon-pricing policies in Australia from 2006 to the present.  It will establish an 
account of the rationale and forces which underpin the Australian state’s 
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preference for carbon pricing over regulatory or direct investment strategies, by 
locating this policy choice within a broader account of state-capital-
environment relations.  This analysis has implications for whether the adopted 
carbon price scheme can be effectively reformed, or whether it is an inherently 
crude, and ultimately ineffective, instrument to respond to the challenge of 
global warming. 
 
Carbon pricing is based on the neoclassical notion of ‘externalities’, which says 
that market processes and exchanges produce external costs that are not 
accounted for in the price of goods themselves (Prasad 2010, p. 363).  In this 
framework pollution is an externality, and climate change is a consequence of a 
‚failure of the price mechanisms, the failure of the market to cost the damaging 
effects of the build up of greenhouse gases‛ (Rosewarne 2010, p. 17).  To move 
towards a low emissions economy, the theory goes, the costs of CO2-equivalent 
emissions need to be internalised by being included in prices.  This can be done 
by issuing pollution permits to industry at a set price, or by setting a cap on 
emissions and letting the market determine the price.  These are, respectively, a 
carbon tax (or a ‘fixed’ carbon price) and an emissions trading scheme (ETS). 
 
In November 2011 the Australian government under then Prime Minister Julia 
Gillard passed legislation to introduce a national carbon price scheme as part of 
the Clean Energy Plan (CEP).  This price was ‚fixed like a tax‛ (Commonwealth 
of Australia 2011, p. 9) and came to be commonly referred to as ‘the carbon tax’.  
The fixed price, set at $23 dollars per tonne of CO2-equivalent and rising by 2.5 
per cent a year, was to last three years before transitioning into a ‚fully flexible 
price under an emissions trading scheme, with the price determined by the 
market‛ (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. 9, p. 15).  
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The logic of carbon pricing has been challenged theoretically and empirically.  
For example, the assertion that a higher price on emissions will lead producers 
and consumers to reduce their consumption of emissions-intensive goods by 
finding substitutes assumes alternative technologies are available, and that all 
the costs associated with technological transition are captured in the price 
(Spash & Yo 2012a, p. 71; Perry et al. 2013, p. 108).  In fact the relationship 
between the price level and the environmental cost, and between the price and 
the cost of any transition, is quite arbitrary, since the price is influenced by 
other factors such as the availability of offsets, the method of permit allocation, 
secondary speculation markets, and political pragmatism (Rosewarne 2010, p. 
39).  Neoclassical economists (e.g. Tietenberg 2006; Pearce 1976) claim carbon 
pricing is a way to force companies to internalise the full costs of their 
environmentally destructive behaviour, but these costs may be displaced 
geographically and temporally rather than internalised (for example by 
relocating production or through the use of credit systems) (Bond 2012, pp. 686-
7).  There is also evidence that firms do not always act to maximise profits, and 
may prefer to absorb an extra cost and a reduced profit rate if it means they 
have a stable level of profit (Prasad 2010, p. 368).  
 
The Australian carbon tax has been criticised against several criteria.  The 
scheme is moderate in its scope, covering only 300 polluting firms, revised 
down from an initial 500 (Spash & Yo 2012b, p. 151).  This is less than half the 
number that would have been covered by the CPRS (Spash & Yo 2012b, p. 151).  
The policy has not been designed to reduce absolute emissions, only to ensure 
that ‚growth in domestic produced carbon pollution slows‛ (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 2011, p. xii).  The target of just 5 per cent emissions reduction by 2020 
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was predicted to be met only through the use of overseas ‘offsets’, with treasury 
modelling showing that domestic emissions will decline only ‚after 2030‛ 
(Treasury 2011, p. 6).  Furthermore, the carbon price risks ‘locking-in’ future 
emissions, particularly from an expected growth in gas-fired power stations 
(Passant 2011, pp. 11-12).  Treasury modelling forecasted gas fired electricity to 
double by 2050 under a carbon price (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. xii).  
‘Compensation’ arrangements for emissions-intensive industries covered by the 
carbon price has also drawn criticism.  The Energy Security Fund, for example, 
had $5.5 billion to ‘assist’ ‚strongly affected generators‛ (CME 2013, p. 3).  
Victorian brown-coal electricity generators collected windfall profits out of 
these arrangements, with a recent study finding they would have reaped 
between $2.3 - $5.4b over approximately five years (CME 2013, p. 5).  This 
provided an incentive to prolong the operating life of inefficient power stations.     
 
Evaluations of the impact of the carbon tax over its 16 months of operation are 
still emerging, but the available information indicates that it is less than a 
success story.  According to the report How Australia’s Carbon Price is Working 
One Year On, emissions generated through the National Electricity Market 
(NEM) fell by 7 per cent between July 2012 and June 2013 (DIICCSRTE 2013, p. 
4).  But electricity demand has been falling for several years now, well before 
the introduction of the carbon price (Brazzale 2013; DRET 2012, p. 31).  One 
major contributor to reduced electricity demand has been the ‚gradual take-up 
of distributed solar photovoltaic generation in the residential sector‛ (DRET 
2012, p. 31).  This is a welcome development, but is the outcome of the 
Renewable Energy Target (RET), not the carbon price (CER 2013).  Another 
factor contributing to falling emissions is reduced demand in the 
manufacturing and industrial sectors, including the closure of Kurri Kurri 
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aluminium smelter in 2012 (Uren 2013; Business Spectator).  This drop off in 
demand is not likely to be permanent: 
Demand is expected to remain steady at its current level during 
2012–13 (AEMO 2012b) before returning to growth over the 
remainder of the decade (DRET 2012, p. 31). 
Over approximately the same period (March 2012-2013) an increase of 12.7 per 
cent in fugitive emissions (leakages) from the mining sector, and an increase in 
non-electricity stationary energy usage, have almost exactly offset the decline in 
emissions from electricity generation (DE 2013, p. 4).  The flaws in carbon 
pricing theory identified by critical academics have been validated by some of 
the outcomes of the Australian carbon tax.  
 
Despite the weaknesses of a carbon price, alternative ways of achieving deep 
emissions cuts have been systematically deprioritised by policy makers.  In 
particular, options based primarily on state-enforced regulation or state-led 
investment into alternative, low-emissions technologies have not received 
serious consideration.  The CEP captures this: 
Rather than relying on government decisions to regulate some 
activities or subsidise others, a carbon price leaves it to millions of 
businesses and consumers to find the most cost-effective ways of 
reducing carbon pollution (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. 
22).  
The Garnaut Climate Change Review (2008), commissioned by former Prime 
Minister Kevin Rudd, goes to exceptional lengths to discourage the use of 
‘regulatory options’ with the mantra ‚Don’t pick winners. Fix market failures‛ 
(Garnaut 2008, p. 317).  The role of the state is to ‘encourage’ businesses to 
transition their investment to cleaner technologies, but not to interfere directly 
in the market domain of production.  Gillard accepted these parameters for 
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action, embracing carbon pricing because it unlocks ‚the genius of the free 
market‛ (Gillard 2010).  The Multi-Party Climate Change Committee (MPCCC), 
which she convened as part of a minority-government agreement with The 
Greens in 2010, considered seven different policy options for addressing climate 
change – all a form of carbon price.  Other possibilities were a priori rejected. 
 
The imminent repeal of the carbon tax makes it timely to re-evaluate forms of 
climate policy, and to interrogate what the former government’s carbon price 
scheme was designed to achieve.  This thesis undertakes such a project by 
building on existing literature which has analysed the limitations and inequities 
of carbon pricing, by situating the policy development of the Australian carbon 
tax in a political economy of state-environment relations, drawn from the 
Marxist tradition.  
 
Since 2005 the literature critically analysing carbon pricing schemes from a 
political-economy perspective has grown substantially.  Interest in the subject 
was roused by the introduction of an ETS in the European Union (EU ETS) in 
2005, and, in Australia, by Rudd’s proposal to introduce an ETS in 2010), 
known as the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS).  The focus of much 
of this academic literature has been on documenting the outcomes of existing 
carbon pricing schemes to compare their outcomes with the neoclassical 
‘textbook’ version of carbon pricing, thereby illuminating the false assumptions 
in neoclassical price theory. 
 
Within this scope two approaches have been taken.  One, exemplified by 
authors such as Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson (2010) and Ben Spies-
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Butcher (2010), has critiqued carbon trading from the perspective of its ‘policy 
design’ and suggested ways to tighten regulation, change the governance 
framework, or make the scheme in question more equitable.  The other 
common approach, characterised in the scholarship of Larry Lohmann (2006; 
2010) and Philip Mirowski, Jeremy Walker and Antoinette Abboud (2013) has 
been to determine that the flaws in these policies are environmentally 
ineffective, but simultaneously favourable to capital, to the degree that carbon 
pricing is better characterised as a tool of capital accumulation than as an 
environmental reform. 
 
It has not been the project of this scholarship to engage explicitly with the state 
itself as a subject of analysis.  But within these two broad camps are two 
implicit understandings of the state: one that characterises the state as ‘neutral’ 
in its operations, the other that views the state as an instrument of capital.  This 
author proposes that fuller engagement with the capitalist state as a subject of 
analysis, one that specifies its agenda, capabilities, structures and relations, 
would open up a new avenue for critical discussion. 
 
To undertake this task this thesis will draw on the work of James O’Connor 
(1973; 1984; 1998) who proposed that the state is shaped by its role of facilitating 
capital accumulation and legitimising the capitalist system (O’Connor 1973; 
1984). One of its primary roles is to produce and maintain the conditions of 
production, namely laborpower, infrastructure and the environment (O’Connor 
1998, pp. 125-126).  These factors are necessary preconditions for market-based 
production, but are not, and cannot be, produced on the market.  However, the 
neglect of these conditions of production limits future accumulation 
possibilities.  In the case of the environment, productivity is undermined and 
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new costs created by the degradation of the quality of air, water and soil 
(O’Connor 1998, p. 123).    
 
The state’s role is to ensure these general conditions.  But the process of doing 
so is likely to be fraught with difficulty because the contradictory nature of the 
capitalist system means that different industries have different interests, the 
short-term needs of the system do not always align with its long-term needs, 
and ensuring the national competitiveness of the economy may be detrimental 
to individual blocks of capital (O’Connor 1998, pp. 150-155).  In its attempt to 
juggle these interests the state may become embroiled in pursuing 
‘contradictory objectives’.  These difficulties are exacerbated by the internal 
incoherence of the state, which is characterised by divergent bureaucratic 
interests (Dryzek 1994; Miliband 1973). 
 
This thesis reconceptualises carbon pricing within this framework, through the 
lens of contradictory state objectives which arise from the state’s attempt to 
reconcile the opposing needs of the capitalist system.  This proposition is 
explored through a detailed examination of the specific ‘state objectives’ which 
have shaped the development of climate policy in Australia between the years 
2006-2012, eventually culminating in the carbon tax.  This is done by drawing 
on Australian Government policy reports, minutes from the Multi-Party 
Climate Change Committee (MPCCC) and a senate inquiry into the carbon tax, 
in addition to historical academic accounts and media reports.  Three objectives 
which have characterised policy discussions over this period are isolated.  
These objectives are: 
1. to contribute to a global project of emissions reduction,  
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2. to maintain the integrity of the government’s neoliberal growth 
strategy,  
3. and to ensure the national competitiveness of the Australian 
economy in the international context.  
The resolution of all three objectives through a single policy, it is proposed, is 
unlikely.  Like an Escher painting, carbon pricing may succeed in doing this on 
paper, but in the space and time of the real economy the inherent contradictions 
cannot be resolved simultaneously.   
 
To fully appreciate the complications the state encounters in attempting to meet 
these objectives, this thesis further proposes that O’Connor’s theory could be 
usefully extended to more systematically account for the impact of the 
transformation of the state under neoliberalism, as well as for the international 
context in which the state operates.  The challenge of climate change is being 
addressed by policymakers within the constraints of a global, neoliberalised 
economy.  Some scholars of neoliberalism (Miraftab 2004; Osborne & Gaebler 
1992) have suggested that the contemporary state has shifted its emphasis from 
taking direct responsibility for certain provisions or regulatory functions to 
governing ‚from a distance‛ (Grabosky 1995, p. 197).   
 
In the present work, this analysis is applied to the environmental ‘conditions of 
production’ as a way of conceptualising what is distinctive about carbon 
pricing as a climate policy.  The impact of the state’s neoliberal interventionist 
approach, and other contradictions that arise through its governance of 
capitalism, will be explored through an examination of some of the actual and 
projected outcomes of carbon pricing and other policies on the electricity mix in 
Australia.  It is argued that the neoliberal form of state intervention favours a 
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continuation of an economic growth regime based on fossil fuels and an 
emissions-intensive electricity sector, and that despite some growth in 
renewably-sourced electricity, the contradictions of Australia’s climate policy 
undermine the possibility of a transition to a low-emissions accumulation 
regime. 
 
Over four chapters, this thesis will seek to demonstrate the usefulness of a 
Marxist account of the state to a political-economy of carbon pricing.  The first 
chapter reviews a cross-section of literature from scholars who have 
contributed to developing theoretical and empirical critiques of carbon pricing, 
and aims to draw out the relationship between their criticisms of carbon pricing 
and their understanding of the state.  The second chapter develops an 
alternative framework for understanding the state, and its relationship to the 
environment vis-à-vis capital, drawn broadly from the work of O’Connor and 
supplemented by other theorists which highlight the contradictory and 
fractured nature of the state.  The third chapter seeks to identify specific 
contradictory state objectives which have underpinned the development of 
carbon price policies in Australia, focusing on the years between 2006-2012.  
Carbon pricing is framed as an expression of the multiple functions the state 
adopts in a capitalist system.  The final chapter examines the government’s 
energy policy through the Energy White Paper 2012, and through examples of 
contradiction that have occurred in the application of a carbon price to the 
economy, including the case of brown-coal fired power stations in Victoria and 
black-coal fired power stations in NSW.   
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CHAPTER 1 
Reviewing carbon pricing literature:  
constructions of the state 
 
This chapter critically reviews a cross-section of literature (spanning the years 
2004 – 2013) that addresses the effectiveness of carbon pricing.  The review 
highlights how the state is conceptualised and constructed throughout this 
literature, and draws out the relationship between this and each scholar’s 
critique of carbon pricing as a means of reducing global carbon emissions.  The 
literature surveyed has been narrowed down to include only scholarship which 
contributes to an empirical or theoretical critique of carbon pricing through 
addressing either taxes or emissions trading schemes (ETSs).  Two distinct 
viewpoints have been identified.  The first group has adopted what this author 
has coined the ‘state-as-neutral’ viewpoint, while the second group adopts what 
will be referred to as a ‘state-as-capital’ viewpoint.   
 
Naturally, the content and focus of scholarship within each group varies 
widely.  These variances make it particularly useful to clearly articulate and 
separate out the two distinct viewpoints, and to consider how the chosen 
viewpoint determines the conclusions drawn by each scholar. Overall, Chapter 
1 of this paper demonstrates that the conclusions drawn about the effectiveness 
of carbon pricing are directly related to each scholar’s viewpoint of the state.  
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1.1 The state-as-neutral viewpoint 
Scholars who adopt a ‘state-as-neutral’ viewpoint broadly embrace the use of 
carbon pricing as an economic-environmental reform to reduce emissions.  In 
this context, ‘neutral’ infers that the state adopts policies in the interests of, or to 
represent the wishes of, general society.  A neutral state is not driven by ulterior 
motives or class bias; it exists only to serve its constituents. 
 
Scholars in this group, including Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson (2010), 
Ben Spies-Butcher (2010), Mark Diesendorf (2008), and Clive Spash and Alex Yo 
(2012), have all highlighted design-flaws in existing carbon pricing schemes.  In 
many cases they have challenged the neoclassical pricing theory which 
underpins these policies.  Nevertheless they maintain that the policy should be 
utilised, and would be effective if properly reformed.  Associated with this 
position is a conceptualisation that the state is essentially passive and 
representative, reflecting the wishes of the people it governs.   However, the 
state is also subject to distorting outside-influences such as lobby group 
pressures and political corruption.   
 
Newell and Paterson’s book Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the 
Transformation of the Environment (2010) epitomises this position.  They accept 
an in-principle role for carbon pricing, and attribute problems to specific policy 
design faults or implementation difficulties: ‚Emissions trading<has to 
overcome a number of technical and political barriers in order to operate 
effectively‛ (Newell & Paterson 2010, p. 136).  They acknowledge that the 
‚actual governance of carbon markets has a number of major inadequacies‛ 
(Newell & Paterson 2010, p. 152), such as weak emissions reduction targets and 
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over-allocation of carbon permits.  But these inadequacies are treated as 
incidental, not systemic. They perceive that government regulation was 
required to bring carbon markets into existence, and therefore once established, 
control parameters can be later strengthened.  Indeed, Newell and Paterson 
argue that ‚there is a certain amount of learning already going on in 
governance, precisely in response to weaknesses in the way they are currently 
governed‛ (2010, p. 152). Therefore, they emphasise problems in governance 
without analysing or critiquing the forces which encourage bad governance, or 
the likelihood of overcoming such forces. Overall, they see no inherent 
impediments to the state reforming carbon-pricing schemes. 
 
The view that the state is capable of designing an effective carbon price scheme, 
even if existing carbon-pricing schemes are less than adequate, is shared by 
Bailey (2010), Grubb (2011), Spies-Butcher (2010), Diesendorf (2008), and, in 
more qualified terms, Stilwell (2011).  Reviewing the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), Bailey posits that, despite evident flaws in 
the policy, ‚Conceptually, tightening of the EU ETS regulatory framework and 
allowance scarcity should produce desired results‛ (2010, p. 144).  Grubb 
articulates this view very succinctly with the heading ‚Everyone will learn‛ 
(2011, p. 6).  The point is made that both governments and industry can expect 
to gradually move towards improved versions of emissions trading schemes as 
they learn from past mistakes.  
Spies-Butcher, while critical of the idea that carbon pricing is genuinely a low 
cost policy, advocates: 
< a more nuanced approach to policy development that seriously 
engages with a range of policy options and is sensitive to the 
political, as well as economic challenges (2010, p. 67).   
19 
 
Similarly Diesendorf, despite criticising the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS), advocates a six point plan to tackle climate change including, 
‚either a carbon tax that is increased every five years or a comprehensive 
emissions trading scheme (ETS) with [a] cap that is tightened every five years‛ 
(ABC 2008). 
 
Diesendorf argues that a carbon tax may be more resilient to corporate pressure 
– identifying that it is the forces outside the state which corrupt an otherwise 
worthwhile policy: 
An emissions trading scheme may be the wrong method of 
applying a carbon price, since it can easily be made ineffective 
under pressure from vested interests (2009, p. 57).   
This argument is echoed by Stilwell (2011, p. 114), who argues that carbon taxes 
exhibit ‚closer alignment between the economic and ethical signals‛ compared 
to emissions trading schemes, and that they offer fewer opportunities for 
profiteering off secondary markets associated with offsets.  Although Stilwell is 
clear that both policy options have deep-seated problems, he ultimately favours 
a tax system because it is less susceptible to market manipulation, but only 
‚once the analytical frame moves beyond the narrow construction of 
neoclassical theory to a broader political economic perspective‛ (2011, p. 115).  
He does not, however, consider whether it is possible for state policy makers to 
adopt this broader perspective.  
 
Spash and Yo (2012; see also Spash 2009) have engaged more critically with the 
logic of carbon pricing, and with the Australian carbon tax in particular, but 
they still maintain an understanding of the state-as-neutral.  Precisely because 
they are so critical of the carbon tax, their proposed solution of a ‚real‛ 
20 
 
greenhouse gas tax (2012, p. 81) is rather surprising.  In seeking to explain ‚why 
[the carbon tax] appears set to be ineffective, highly costly and mainly of 
financial benefit to big polluters‛ (Spash & Yo 2012a, p. 68), they do not engage 
in any analysis of state objectives, but conclude that ‚Australia exemplifies how 
the rich and powerful polluters have been able to take control of the debate on 
human induced climate change‛ (Spash & Yo 2012a, p. 82).  Spash and Yo do 
recognise, in passing, internal state processes of negotiation which shape policy 
development.  But this is still seen as something imposed on the state by more 
powerful outside players:  
All regulatory and public policy instruments are subject to 
political negotiation and vested interests. While taxes favour 
government, they can also be watered down and 
counterproductive. Substantial concessions to polluting industries 
in the form of tax exemptions, reductions and rebates<may 
appear in design proposals (Spash & Yo 2012a, p. 81). 
They do not consider that the state may have its own will, with an independent 
agenda and the means to carry it out.  They assert the problem with Australia’s 
carbon tax is that it is ‚departing from some of the defining principles of a 
pollution tax‛ (Spash & Yo 2012a, p. 81).  A ‚correctly designed‛ carbon tax, 
they argue, ‚could provide more pollution-control-cost certainty than an ETS 
and have greater capacity for revenue recycling‛ (Spash & Yo 2012a, p. 81).  
Spash and Yo do not question whether it is consistent with the agenda of the 
Australian state to redesign the carbon tax or elevate its revenue-raising 
capacity. 
 
Overall it can be seen that throughout the abovementioned literature, there is a 
widespread tendency to identify isolated faults with carbon pricing policies, 
and argue for policy design improvements, without any, or sufficient, 
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appreciation for whether the state is capable of, or interested in, reforming the 
policy in the way these scholars suggest.  They identify policy limits according 
to the criteria of environmental effectiveness and equity, but do not interrogate 
how the state’s criteria may be shaped by other factors.  Chapter 3 of this thesis 
further explores this point.     
 
1.2 The state-as-capital viewpoint 
The second group of theorists, which includes Larry Lohmann (2006; 2010), 
Philip Mirowski, Jeremy Walker and Antoinette Abboud (2013), Adam Bumpus 
and Diana Liverman (2008), and Karine Matthews and Matthew Paterson 
(2005), view carbon pricing as a tool in the state-capital project of creating new 
sites for capital accumulation and entrenching the inequities of capitalism.  The 
scholarship of this second group echoes sections of the climate movement 
which have called emissions-trading schemes and offset schemes ‘false 
solutions’ (see, for example, Rising Tide North America & Carbon Trade Watch 
n.d.; Friends of the Earth International 2007; Goodman 2009; Bachram 2006).  
The class-bias inherent in carbon-pricing is identified in the entrenchment of the 
legal right of companies to pollute, the displacement of the cost of climate 
action onto the poor, the working class and the ‘global South’, and in the 
creation of multibillion-dollar carbon finance markets which provide new 
avenues to profit from polluting activities.   
 
This second group’s characterisation of the state and state-capital relations is 
insightful for evaluating some of the more perverse outcomes of carbon price 
schemes.  However it tends to treat capital as entirely hegemonic and shows 
little appreciation for the conflicts that exist between different fractions, or 
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industries, within the capitalist class, within the state system, or between the 
state and capital.  The possibility that climate change represents a genuine 
threat to capital accumulation, and to national economic growth, is overlooked, 
and carbon pricing is explained as a complicated ruse by capital’s stakeholders 
to consolidate their power.   
 
Lohmann, for example, calls carbon pricing a ‚fix‛ designed ‚for containing the 
political threats implied by climate change – while at the same time using it to 
create new opportunities for corporate profit‛ (2006, p. 45).  He directly blames 
the United States government, since market mechanisms represent the 
hegemony of US policy designed for US interests, which were foisted onto the 
rest of the world at the Kyoto Climate Summit: ‚The US was also able to impose 
a language on the climate talks in which objections to neoliberal policies could 
not be effectively made‛ (Lohmann 2006, p. 50).  According to Lohmann, the 
essential feature of these neoliberal climate policies is the ‚entrenchment of 
corporate power over carbon dumps‛ (Lohmann 2006, p. 34). A significant 
shortcoming of Lohmann’s overall narrative is that he does not explain the 
structural mechanisms which uphold corporate interests.  His analysis relies 
instead on attributing one particular section of capital with an infinite capacity 
to impose its will. 
 
Mirowski et al. (2013) contribute to this carbon pricing-as-conspiracy theory, 
arguing it fits into a three part strategy employed by neoliberal ideologues to 
delay action on climate change.  Climate denialism, emissions trading, and geo-
engineering schemes appear as ‚distinct and contradictory policies, [but] are in 
fact integrated in such a way as to produce eventual capitulation to the free 
market‛ (Mirowski et al. 2013, p. 81).  According to Mirkwoski et al. climate 
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denialism allows action to be delayed in the short term, while emissions 
trading, which ‚doesn’t work – and was never intended to‛ (Mirowski et al. 
2013, p. 85), is implemented as a medium-term solution, and utopian 
technology is implemented as a final long term solution.  Mirowski et al. claims 
that the state is a crude tool of the capitalist class, which has a unified, long-
term agenda to control climate policy. According to them, the appearance of 
conflicting or diverging policy solutions advocated by capital is only further 
proof of the power of capital to control the climate debate.  
 
Bumpus and Liverman (2008) offer a more subtle analysis, but it exhibits the 
same tendency to emphasise the strengths of capital and ignore any 
weaknesses.  They characterise carbon trading, particularly the offset schemes 
associated with it, as aiding a process of ‚Accumulation by Decarbonisation‛ 
(Bumpus and Liverman 2008, p. 127).  Carbon offsets are: 
<a case of neoliberal environmental governance in which the 
management of an environmental problem is partly devolved to 
the market and to the individual but in which the state eventually 
establishes the rules under which markets operate (Bumpus and 
Liverman 2008, p. 145).   
They describe the state’s role as intervening to allocate and secure private 
property rights, provide scientific knowledge, and create stable market 
institutions. They show that by implementing carbon pricing schemes, the state 
aids capital accumulation and polluting industries.  This analysis would be 
strengthened by incorporating a more nuanced understanding of state-capital 
relations which accounts for conflicting interests. 
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Matthews and Paterson (2005) add to this perception of the state-as-capital 
(despite Paterson elsewhere making arguments which would locate him in the 
state-as-neutral category).  They argue that the state’s role is to promote capital 
accumulation, and in particular to seek out new sites of accumulation.  They 
resolve the apparent paradox of why ‚states pursue Kyoto and emissions 
reduction even when the economic costs are significant and the environment 
benefits minimal‛ (Matthews & Paterson 2005, p. 62), by recognising that 
‚possible market opportunities *are+ created by Kyoto and by emissions 
reductions‛ (Matthews & Paterson 2005, p. 62).   
 
Scholars in this second group differ from the first because they do not consider 
the state to be neutral in its class-orientation.  There is, however, significant 
overlap, because neither tendency ascribes an independent agenda to the state.  
The first group treats the state as if it has no agenda outside a purely 
representative one, and theorists underestimate the degree to which it is a 
capitalist entity.  The second group frames the state’s agenda as an extension of 
capital, but overlooks the way that the incoherent and contradictory nature of 
capital means that the state cannot represent it in any straightforward way.  
 
1.3 Complicating state relations 
An overall more sophisticated and multidimensional understanding of the state 
and its relationship to capital would provide the foundation for a more 
nuanced theory of carbon pricing, which could explain its faults without 
caricaturing the ability of capital to shape the climate debate.  There are a 
number of theorists that go some way towards this.  I will briefly examine two 
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theorists - Bond (2012) and Rosewarne (2010) - whose contributions will be 
elaborated through an original framework in the following chapter.   
 
Bond (2012) accounts for the problems, as well as advantages, that are posed for 
the capitalist system by climate change and by carbon pricing schemes.  Like 
scholars in the second group, he argues that carbon trading is merely capital 
accumulation by another name – ‚accumulation by dispossession‛ (Bond 2012, 
p. 688) – which allows capital ‚penetration of non-market spheres by capital‛ 
(Bond 2012, p. 688).  However, he also highlights that the environmental, social 
and financial consequences of carbon trading mean that ‚deep-seated 
contradictions in industrial capitalism invariably bubble up into both financial 
and carbon markets‛ (Bond 2012, p. 689).  Bond provides this analogy of carbon 
trading: 
[It is] at best a shifting of the deck chairs on both the climate and 
economic Titanics, and at worst<carbon markets...have sprung 
leaks that are so intimidating, even the US capitalist class has not 
found a way to patch up the idea of a market solution to a market 
problem (Bond 2012, p. 689). 
Precisely because carbon trading seems ineffective as a tool to reduce emissions, 
and effective as an avenue for accumulation, the ‘market problem’ of climate 
change remains.  This creates its own problems for the system.  But Bond’s 
contribution is unelaborated, and he does not account for the challenge that this 
conundrum poses for the state in particular.  
 
Rosewarne’s contribution to the debate goes further than most in recognising 
the state’s agency and its independent agenda in pricing carbon.  He argues that 
the main rationale for pricing carbon is ‚a none-too-subtle agenda to sustain 
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capital accumulation‛ (Rosewarne 2010, p. 48).  Government reports such as the 
Stern Review and the Garnaut Review are representative of this agenda 
(Rosewarne 2010, p. 47).  The many concessions and financial rewards 
promised to polluters are not simply the outcome of vested interests, but of the 
state’s own concern of ‚not frustrating the growth objective‛ (Rosewarne 2010, 
p. 47).   
 
Earlier work by Rosewarne is more explicit regarding the state’s role.  
Explaining why the Australian government would not sign the Kyoto Protocol, 
he argues that it was ‚bound up with the state's conviction that the key to 
maintaining the pace of capital accumulation is linked to the future of the 
resource sector‛ (Rosewarne 2003, p. 26).  The state’s role, this suggests, is to 
manage long-term economic growth.  Rosewarne also asserts that the state 
needs to be understood as an ‚arena for progressing different strategic 
agendas‛ (2003, p. 2).  He contextualises the development of environmental 
policy within the neoliberal ‚transformation in the character and role of the 
state‛ (2003, p. 19).  While the state’s role is to maintain an environment for 
capital accumulation, the manner in which it sets out to achieve this objective is 
historically and strategically flexible.  There is certainly great potential for 
valuable analysis involving the application of these insights  directly to the 
current carbon price model in Australia.  Rosewarne’s analysis could be further 
developed to also account for the way in which climate change poses long and 
short-term threats to a stable regime of capital accumulation. 
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1.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined constructions of the state across a number of 
important critiques of carbon pricing, and suggested that our understanding of 
the drivers of climate change policy could be enhanced by more clearly 
articulating state-capital relations.  Such an articulation should go beyond 
identifying the state as a representative body, or as a tool of capital, and account 
for the myriad of complexities the state faces in formulating a policy aimed at 
emissions reduction, such as conflicting perspectives of stakeholders within the 
capitalist class and the state itself, as well as contradictions which arise in the 
accumulation process. 
 
The following chapters subsequently demonstrate that the state is an active 
player in maintaining an ailing capitalist system that cannot accommodate 
environmental concerns.  The state empowers capital by approaching the 
climate crisis on terms set by the market, with a ‘solution’ that promises to 
offset the market’s exploitation of resources and allow capital to trade its way 
out of trouble.  This therefore creates new sites for capital accumulation, whilst 
simultaneously deepening and delaying the climate change problem that has 
the potential to undermine capital, or sections of capital, along with the state’s 
power and legitimacy.  Chapter 2 develops this argument by setting out a 
Marxist framework for conceptualising state-capital-environment relations.     
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CHAPTER 2 
The state, capital and environment: a Marxist framework 
 
James O’Connor’s essay ‘The Conditions of Production and the Production of 
Conditions’ (1998) examines the state’s role in managing the environment 
under capitalism.  The basic propositions put forward in his essay provide a 
useful starting point for developing a dynamic account of the state which goes 
beyond the scope of those found in the critical literature on carbon pricing.  
O’Connor’s work has been utilised in this thesis because it illuminates both a) 
the way environmental damage, brought about through processes of capital 
accumulation, reacts back on and undermines capital itself and b) the way the 
complex structures, relations and processes, which make up the state system, 
shape it as a class-biased state but also render it a victim of its own 
contradictions.  O’Connor’s integration of his theory of the state with his theory 
of the environment makes his work particularly relevant to the task undertaken 
in this thesis.  
 
The state’s underlying functions, according to O’Connor, are to maintain the 
conditions for capital accumulation, and legitimise the system (1973, p. 6; 1984, 
p. 190).  He identifies a relatively sustainable environment as a specific 
‘condition of production’ necessary for accumulation (O’Connor 1998, pp. 125-
6).  As a condition for, and not a product of, a market-economy, the conditions of 
production must be produced and maintained outside the formal economy in 
order for industrial exchange-based production to take place.  Responsibility 
over the conditions of production cannot be left to capital itself, because the 
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anarchic and competitive nature of production means no individual capital will 
accept the cost burden.  This task is therefore the responsibility of the state.  But 
the divergent, and opposing, needs of the capitalist economic system have 
profound implications for the ability of the state to sustain the conditions for 
accumulation.  The state itself is a contradictory entity, so that it ‚may undo 
with one hand what it does with the other‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 150).  Later 
chapters in this thesis will argue that the Australian government’s climate 
policy is a case in point.     
 
Unfortunately to date O’Connor has provided only one short essay which 
systematically integrates his theories on the state and the environment.  A fuller 
account of state-environment relations will be developed throughout this 
chapter, drawing on O’Connor’s broader body of writing, and supplemented 
by the work of some other state-theorists and Marxist ecologists. 
 
The chapter is divided into four parts.  The first part outlines the general 
features of the state - its relative autonomy from capital, its functions in 
securing accumulation and legitimation, and the costs it incurs through 
constituting the conditions for accumulation domestically and globally.  The 
second part will examine the environment as a ‘condition of production’ and 
look at the state’s role in managing these conditions in particular.  The third 
section will explain why the state may fail to adequately produce and 
reproduce the conditions of production, namely because it finds itself engaged 
in ‘contradictory state objectives’.  The final section will suggest that 
O’Connor’s framework would be strengthened with two additions: analysing 
the neoliberal transformation of the state and the impact this has on state-
environment relations, and, secondly, accounting for the international system of 
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states in which each state operates and how this shapes the development of 
policy.  
 
2.1 General features of the state 
In the 1960s and 1970s Marxists turned to the task of defining the precise nature 
of the relationship of the state to capital (Panitch 1999, p. 20).  There was 
nothing new in the state actively intervening into the economy, but the ‚scale 
and pervasiveness of state intervention in contemporary capitalism is now 
immeasurably greater than ever before‛ (Miliband 1973, p. 10).  The state, it was 
agreed, is ‚relatively autonomous‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 148; Panitch 1999, p. 22); 
it is an institution with its own logic that cannot be equated to that of capital, 
but its autonomy is contingent on the dominant class structures of the economy 
(Konings 2010, p. 175).  The state may be independent from any particular 
fraction of capital, but this is so it can better serve the interests of the whole 
system.  Institutional separation from production allows the state to manage 
class conflict, by ‚channelling the conflicts arising from the real nature of 
capitalist society into the fetishized forms of the bourgeois political processes‛ 
(Holloway & Picciotto 1991, p. 115).  Its independence is also necessary to 
supply ‚crucial extra-economic preconditions of the circuit of capital that must 
be secured through an impartial organ standing outside and above the market‛ 
(Jessop 1991, p. 169).  The state’s role is to cohere capitalism, and to do this it 
needs to be relatively autonomous from capital.  
 
O’Connor helped pioneer this wave of Marxist state-theory (Panitch 1999, p. 
20).  His conception, like his contemporaries, was that: 
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<the state is itself a complex structure of authority relations 
bearing (perhaps requiring) a certain degree of autonomy, and is 
by no means a simple instrument for specific capitalists or even 
capitalists as a whole (Bay Area Kapitalistate Group1 [BAKG] 
1975, p. 149).  
Divorced from the most immediate interests of capital, the state can grant some 
concessions to non-capitalist groups, thereby integrating them into the system.  
The logic is that ‚the state preserves the class structure precisely because it 
becomes in some sense independent of it‛ (BAKG 1975, p. 154). 
 
The task of ‘preserving the class structure’ is, more precisely, two-fold: the state 
must aim to secure the conditions of accumulation, and it must act to legitimise 
capitalism (O’Connor 1973, p. 6; 1984, p. 190).  The power of the state lies in its 
ability to tax, spend and intervene in the economy and society: 
<a state that ignores the necessity of assisting the process of 
capital accumulation risks drying up the source of its own power, 
the economic surplus production capacity and the taxes drawn 
from this surplus (O’Connor 1973, p. 6). 
For this reason the state is not neutral, but a capitalist state, because its very 
existence is intimately bound up with the reproduction of the bloc of national-
capital it governs.  However, by assisting this process of economic expansion, 
the state risks exposing its class bias and delegitimising its right to rule: 
A capitalist state that openly uses its coercive forces to help one 
class accumulate capital at the expense of other classes loses its 
legitimacy and hence undermines the basis of its loyalty and 
support (O’Connor 1973, p. 6). 
                                                     
1 The Bay Area Kapitalistate Group, of which O’Connor was a member, was an editorial group 
that produced the journal Kapitalistate.  The article quoted is a collaborative work of the group, 
‚the outcome of lengthy discussions‛ (BAKG 1975, p. 149). 
2 The first contradiction is a ‚realization crisis, or crisis of capital over-production‛ (O’Connor 
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Therefore, to safeguard the capitalist system and its own existence, the state 
must manage and disperse class conflicts through a process of legitimation.  An 
example of states fulfilling both these functions is found in the pretexts used by 
nation-states going to war for resource control.  For example, O’Connor notes 
the use of the ‚transparently self-serving doctrine of the ‘New World Order’‛ 
used by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War as cover for a war aimed at 
securing future oil supplies (O’Connor 1998, p. 213).  
 
In order to fulfil its functions the state requires a degree of autonomy from 
capital.  Sectional interests organised into ‘interest groups’ may vie for influence 
in, and attention from, the state, but ‚interest-group politics is inconsistent with 
the survival and expansion of capitalism‛ (O’Connor 1973, p. 67) because this 
would lead to contradictory policies.  ‚Paradoxically, enduring interest groups 
require a sense of ‘responsibility’ – that is, class consciousness‛ (O’Connor 1973, 
p. 67).   
 
The state must be the highest expression of this class consciousness.  One 
reason for this is that accumulation conditions must be constructed both 
domestically and internationally.   Marx’s oft-repeated characterisation of the 
state as a ‘committee’ for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie misses the fact that this bourgeoisie is an international class which 
spans a system of nation states, which are in vicious competition (Barker 1991, 
p. 205).  Nation-states cannot afford to become too involved in the inter-capital 
conflicts within their borders; they must project unity in the face of global 
animosity.  When promoting capital accumulation, the state must attempt to 
project authority beyond its borders to create the global conditions that most 
benefit the specific needs of its capital, such as forming diplomatic relations and 
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securing trade contracts for imports and exports.  Eliminating ‘hostile’ forces – 
unaccommodating governments, revolutions, ‘terrorists’ and so forth – is part 
of fulfilling this function.   
 
Climate change has increasingly been viewed through this lens, as a threat to 
global accumulation conditions.  In 2003 the Pentagon put out a report titled An 
Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and its Implications for United States National 
Security, which detailed the likelihood of instability in war as a consequence of 
abrupt climate change (Monthly Review 2004).  More recently, John Ackerman 
(2008), an assistant professor of national security studies at the Alabama Air 
Command and Staff College, has written a paper comparing climate change to 
terrorism (the comparison hinging on the ‘non-state’ actors posing the ‘threat’).  
He argues, ‚adverse climatological effects may have direct and negative 
political consequences that threaten local and regional stability and long-term 
US security‛ (2008, p. 60).  In his opinion, global warming puts the 
‚organization, training, equipping, and planning of the military services‛ 
(Ackerman 2008, p. 57) at risk.  Climate change threatens food security; will 
result in more floods, which are the most costly natural disaster in the United 
States; may exacerbate tensions in ‚volatile regions of the world‛ and create 
more refugees; and result in ‚unexpected side effects created by international 
geo-engineering projects designed to alleviate global warming‛ (Ackerman 
2008, p. 64).  Climate change has the potential to disrupt, or increase the risks 
association with the state’s role in securing accumulation conditions.  
 
As the political agent responsible for the reproduction of capital accumulation 
and social life, locally and globally, the state is subject to competing claims for 
public funds (Stroshane 1997, p. 115).  The accumulation and legitimation 
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processes both involve significant costs.  Costs that assist directly or indirectly 
in capital accumulation are ‘social investment’, while those that serve only to 
legitimise the state without benefit to capital are ‘social expenses’ (O’Connor 
1973).  Social expenses include things such as food-subsidies and some welfare 
payments.  Social investment includes government contributions to research 
and development programs, upgrades to telecommunications systems or 
energy infrastructure.  These costs run high, with demands for expenditure 
coming from ‚corporations, industries, regional and other business interests‛ 
(O’Connor 1973, p. 9).  O’Connor argues that legitimation is also a costly affair:  
Governments may have to not only appear to, but also in fact 
devise economic and social policies which fulfil working-
class/salariat needs whether or not these policies fulfil capitalistic 
systemic economic and social needs (O’Connor 1984, p. 196). 
Securing legitimacy is ‚the price that the state must pay for political consensus 
and legitimation‛ (O’Connor 1981, p. 44).  The consequence is a growing fiscal 
burden on the state.  The state becomes engaged in a ‚dialectical and reciprocal 
process‛ in which state expenditures which assist private capital create, in turn, 
new demands for social expenses ‚to prevent or remedy the ‘social costs’ of 
accumulation‛ (O’Connor 1981, p. 46). 
 
2.2 The conditions of production 
The state’s role in the reproduction of accumulation and social life can be 
analysed more deeply.  One of the needs of capital accumulation is ‚the 
politically guaranteed existence‛ of the conditions of production (O’Connor 
1998, p. 149).  The ‘conditions of production’ are those conditions which are 
necessary for industrial market-based production, but are not themselves 
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produced on the market.  O’Connor divides the conditions of production into 
three categories, taken from Karl Marx: 
<the ‘personal condition’ or human laborpower (‘human 
capital’), ‘external conditions’ or environment, broadly defined 
(‘nature capital’), and ‘general communal conditions’ or urban 
infrastructure and urban space – and, we might add, community 
insofar as community can be potentially capitalized (‘community 
capital’) (O’Connor 1998, pp. 125-6). 
These can be summarised as laborpower, infrastructure, and the environment.   
 
O’Connor frames these using Polanyi’s concept of ‘fictitious commodities’ to 
highlight the fact that the production and reproduction of these elements occurs 
outside the circuit of capital.  This contrasts to the myth of a ‘self-regulating’ 
market, which falsely implies that all goods that enter the productive process 
are also produced on the market (Polanyi 1944, p. 69).  In fact, each of the 
conditions of production constitutes a precondition for a functioning market, 
but the market cannot guarantee their availability in the ‚requisite quantities 
and qualities and at the right place and time‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 147).  
‘Environmental’ or ‘external’ conditions fall into two subdivisions: the ‚natural 
wealth in means of subsistence‛ such as edible plants, productive soil or oceans 
of fish, and ‚natural wealth in the instruments of labor‛ such as mineral 
deposits, waterfalls, and wood (O’Connor 1998, p. 146).  These conditions are 
naturally occurring, and not produced on the market as such.  It is evident that, 
for all the conditions of production, ‚the postulate that anything that is bought 
and sold must have been produced for sale is emphatically untrue‛ (Polanyi 
1944, p. 72).   
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It is not only that capital cannot secure its own conditions of existence, but that 
left to its own devices capitalism may very well destroy them.  As Polanyi says:   
In disposing of a man’s labor power the system would, 
incidentally, dispose of the physical, psychological, and moral 
entity ‘man’ attached to that tag<Nature would be reduced to its 
elements, neighbourhoods and landscapes defiled, rivers 
polluted<the power to produce food and raw materials 
destroyed (Polanyi 1944, p. 73).   
It is not in the nature of capital to regulate the limits of its own power to exploit.  
It is, therefore, the state which must regulate the ‚access to, use of, and exit 
from‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 148) these conditions of production.  O’Connor 
estimates that all of the state’s domestic functions (fiscal policy and domestic 
law-and-order aside) can be traced back to the regulation of the production 
conditions.  
 
The blindly expansionary quality of capitalism – driven by the internal logic of 
‚accumulation for accumulation’s sake‛ (Kovel 2002, p. 156) – exhibits a 
limitless capacity to exploit both labour and the environment.  This ensures that 
exchange-value dominates use-value (Kovel 2002, p. 40), and the creation of 
wealth generates poverty and environmental degradation (Bellamy Foster 1992, 
p. 78).  People ‚living as capital‛ (Kovel 2002, p. 39) thus end up destroying the 
environment: the source of human life.  
 
37 
 
O’Connor considers this tension between capital’s need for sustainable 
conditions of production and its tendency to degrade these conditions to be so 
acute that it constitutes a ‘second contradiction of capitalism2: 
<the neglect of education and health (for example), 
infrastructure, and the natural environment may lead to the 
impairment of their productive powers, hence, indirectly to the 
diminution of the productive power of capital, that is, to economic 
crisis (O’Connor 1998, p. 148). 
The toil that production takes on the quality of air, water and land in fact 
reduces the range of options for future accumulation, makes labour less 
productive, and produces substantial new costs for the system (O’Connor 1998, 
p. 123). 
 
O’Connor himself has not offered a detailed breakdown of climate change as a 
threat to the conditions of production, though he has cited global warming as 
an example of capital undermining its own conditions, arguing it will 
‚inevitably destroy people, places, and profits, not to speak of other species 
life‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 166).  The Stern Review says that climate change 
threatens ‚water supply, food production, human health, availability of land, 
and ecosystems‛ (Stern 2006, p. 58).  It highlights the potential changes to the 
water cycle, which will ‚strongly reduce dry-season water supplies to one-sixth 
of the world’s population‛ (Stern 2006, p. 56).  Only 8 per cent of freshwater is 
used for ‚drinking, sanitation, and recreation‛ directly, while the rest is used to 
irrigate crops and in manufacturing and energy processes, making water a 
‚critical input for almost all production‛ (Stern 2006, p. 62).  Beyond this, food 
production is directly threatened by high levels of global warming (low-mid 
                                                     
2 The first contradiction is a ‚realization crisis, or crisis of capital over-production‛ (O’Connor 
1991, p. 107).  
38 
 
level rises of 2 – 3°C will also adversely affect crop yield in tropical areas, but 
may improve crop yield at higher latitudes) (Stern 2006, p. 56, 67).  Ocean 
acidification – another outcome of global warming – may very well reduce fish 
stocks (Stern 2006, p. 72).   
 
These damages obviously threaten human livelihood.  They also threaten the 
profits of various fractions of capital.  Environmental Degradation exacerbates 
rifts between different sections of capital, since some fractions – real estate, 
agriculture, fisheries, recreation and tourism, for instance – rely on good quality 
or highly productive environmental conditions (O’Connor 1973, p. 176).  The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), for instance, predicted 
that: 
Multiple industries, such as timber, fisheries, travel, tourism and 
agriculture are threatened by disturbances caused by climate 
change. Impacts on these sectors will influence financial markets, 
insurance companies and large multinational investors (IPCC 
2007, p. 257).   
The challenge of managing environmental condition is, for the state, therefore 
also a challenge of managing the tensions inside the capitalist class, as well as of 
shouldering a further ‘fiscal burden’ as increasing proportions of the state 
budget are directed to environmental clean up (O’Connor 1973, p. 176).  As 
O’Connor highlights, ‚Environmental degradation requires huge unproductive 
outlays of capital for environmental protection and cleanup‛ (O’Connor 1998, 
p. 129).  This is a cost that private capital strives to avoid.   
 
Environmental degradation, we can see, poses a two-pronged challenge for the 
state.  On the one hand the state must attempt to prevent the worst excesses of 
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environmental impacts which will destabilise the economy, ruin certain sectors 
of the economy, produce unintended outcomes, put national food and water 
security at risk, and damage the health of the working population. On the other 
hand the state must at the same time find ways to meet the cost of this endless 
patch-up job. 
 
The nature of the challenge is such that, in the process of acting to secure the 
conditions for production outside the market, the state confronts what may 
prove to be insurmountable contradictions.  The conditions of production fulfil 
a definite use-function in the system, but they operate within certain relations 
of production.  They are ‚produced and reproduced<within definite property, 
legal, and social relationships‛ which ‚may or may not be compatible with the 
reproduction of these conditions defined as productive forces‛ (O’Connor 1998, 
p. 148).  As Clarke suggests, the state’s attempt to satisfy the general interest of 
capital is constantly thwarted, because the general interest does not exist; ‚All 
that exists is a particular resolution of conflicting interests‛ (Clarke 1991, p. 
186).  Each time the state acts to resolve one conflict it inevitably brings forth 
new ones, by acting against certain other interests.   
 
2.3 Contradictory state objectives 
We have already seen that O’Connor considers the state can confront 
contradictions when trying to secure accumulation conditions for capital.  This 
applies in a particularly stark form to the conditions of production because of 
their highly politicised nature (O’Connor 1998, pp. 164-5) and because capital 
treats them as if they are limitless (Altaver 1993, pp. 219-220).  There is no 
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guarantee that the state will be able to ensure the ongoing viability of 
capitalism’s conditions.  Far from it:  
It is possible that capital will impair or destroy its own conditions 
in systematic ways, and also that the state as presently structured 
will not be able to rationally defend or reconstruct these 
conditions (O’Connor 1998, p. 155).   
Because capitalist production is characterised by inherent contradictions, 
conflicts can erupt ‚between fractions of capital and within the state and civil 
society, as well as between capital, the state, and civil society‛ (O’Connor 1998, 
p. 155).  These conflicts may ultimately run too deep for the state to formulate 
and implement policies which will sustain laborpower, urban infrastructure, 
and the environment in the long term (O’Connor 1998, p. 155).  In attempting to 
manage these conditions, the state will confront two distinct sets of 
contradictions:  
<contradictions within capital and their implications for state 
policy; and contradictions within and between state-produced-or-
regulated conditions of production themselves (O’Connor 1998, p. 
150).  
These include conflicting interests between individual capitals and the needs of 
capital as a whole; conflicting interests between fractions of capital, for instance 
between big and small capital, low and high-tech capital, and national and 
international capital; and conflicting interests between the long and short-term 
needs of capital (O’Connor 1998, pp. 150-1).   
 
Not only are the state’s functions potentially contradictory, but the state is not a 
cohesive body with a unified agenda.  It is ‚subject to its own internal 
tendencies and contradictions‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 152).  As Miliband put it, 
‚‘the state’ is not a thing<it does not, as such, exist‛ (1973, p. 47).  It is, rather, a 
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series of interacting institutions which are better described as a ‚state system‛ 
(Miliband 1973, p. 47).  Conflicts emerge within the state-system between 
branches with ‚divergent bureaucratic interests‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 152).  The 
bureaucratised state apparatus operates according to deeply entrenched 
conventions, which underscore policy development processes.  These 
conventions can themselves shape outcomes because ‚the relationship between 
means and ends becomes inverted; the nature of the administrative means 
determines the policy goal or end‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 152).   
 
Dryzek (1994) offers a useful breakdown of the limits to the problem-solving 
capacity of liberal democracy, and of the administrative apparatus of the state.  
Among them are that liberal democratic governments tend to ‚identify and 
disaggregate environmental problems based on the particular interests of 
affected parties‛ (Dryzek 1994, p. 180).  Ecological problems, for instance, are 
not approached from the broadest possible ecological standpoint, but from the 
point of view of a constituent with a claim on the state.  Liberal democracy is 
interested in placating interest groups, not formulating long-term solutions.  
The Gillard-government’s carbon tax policy is a case in point.  On the one hand, 
a price was put on pollution to address environmental concerns, while on the 
other hand compensation and free permits were given to emissions-intensive 
industries and trade-exposed industries to shield these interests groups from 
the impacts of that price (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. 55).   
 
In contrast the administrative state claims to be the ‚embodiment of common 
purpose, neutral expertise, the capability to make sense of complex problems, 
and the will and authority to effect solutions to these problems‛ (Dyzek 1994, p. 
180).  But in fact administrative apparatuses are trained to perform only a 
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limited range of regimented functions (Dryzek 1994, p. 181).  Their structures 
prohibit creative or holistic solutions to complex problems, because hierarchical 
structures, combined with the division of administrative labour, create an 
incentive for each sub-unit to find ‘solutions’ to immediate problems that, in 
reality, displace the problem through space, time, or onto another 
administrative unit (Dryzek 1994, pp. 181-2). 
 
Contradictions also arise between the timeframe needed to implement policies 
and the election cycle (O’Connor 1998, p. 151).  Elections create an incentive for 
government to respond to short term problems and offer short term solutions 
(Dryzek 1994, p. 180).  Added to the problems intrinsic to the structures of 
government and administration is that these structures are populated by 
individuals who are ‚themselves political subjects who are constrained by the 
dominant ideology, the citizenry, and capital itself‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 154).  
These actors are socialised precisely to imagine they are disinterestedly solving 
problems in the interests of the public good, and to act as if they are external to 
the world of problems they are employed to fix when in fact they work to 
maintain the cohesion of a deeply biased system (Konings 2010, p. 178).  The 
anti-democratic nature of bureaucracy, and the practise of finding compromises 
between the post powerful political players, makes the state ‚insensitive to 
environmental and other issues raised from below.‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 247).  
   
This is not an exhaustive list of the contradictions that the state must grapple 
with, but it is sufficient to understand O’Connor’s point: the state is engaged in 
a multitude of projects, aimed at fulfilling a multitude of requirements, 
simultaneously.  The conflicts and contradictions of the system manifest in the 
state’s own structures and policies, and the peculiar methods and codes of the 
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state bureaucracy dominate the processes of problem solving.  While managing 
strong capital accumulation is an overarching priority for the state, capital 
accumulation is itself contradictory, and acting on this priority is therefore a 
complicated task, one that is ‚served<not through an uninterrupted process, 
but instead through a series of conflicts and confrontations, piecemeal changes 
and sudden spurts of action‛ (Mosely *quote+ in O’Connor 1998, p. 153).  The 
state will not be able to overcome all of the contradictions it faces at all times.   
 
2.4 Expanding the framework 
To expand this analysis, O’Connor’s theory can be extended to account for two 
more factors: the neoliberal transformation of the state, and the international 
context in which the state operates.  The manner in which the state regulates the 
conditions of production under neoliberalism deserves its own analysis.  
O’Connor’s work contains isolated remarks that help to formulate such an 
analysis.  By his admission ‚Fiscal Crisis failed to anticipate the rise of 
neoliberalism and globalization‛, however he also maintains that ‚the pillars of 
neoliberalism – privatization, liberalization of foreign exchange markets and 
investments, deregulation – are all consistent with the analysis in FCS‛ 
(O’Connor 2001, p. 110).  The fundamental difference to the claims originally 
made in Fiscal Crisis, in order to account for a neoliberalised economy, would be 
that ‚the contradictions of the system are no longer displaced as frequently into 
the state and state finances as they are into the sector of small or competitive 
capital‛ (2001, p. 111).  The result is that:  
<the lower one-third or one-half of the U.S. working class suffers 
impaired conditions of life and real incomes. In other words, the 
state’s ‚legitimation function‛ no longer requires ‚pay offs‛ to 
economic losers<The problem of legitimation has been 
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transformed into the problem of ‘competitiveness in the global 
marketplace’ (O’Connor 2001, p. 111).   
Here O’Connor introduces some significant new ideas that are not fully 
integrated into his ecological writings.  He proposes that the state does not 
necessarily have to bear the entire burden of the costs generated through capital’s 
destructive accumulation process, because the contradictions of the system can 
be displaced to arenas other than the state.  Furthermore the legitimation 
function of the state no longer necessarily has to costly.  This is not because 
O’Connor accepts the common myth that neoliberalism entails a shrinking state 
and reduced spending.  To the contrary he argues, logically, that the reality of 
neoliberalism does not fit the model on this point (O’Connor 2001, p. 104; see 
also Cahill 2009, p. 301).  But he acknowledges that there is no fixed way that the 
state has to go about meeting the costs associated with its various functions.   
 
In ‘The Conditions of Production and the Production of Conditions’ (1998) 
O’Connor specifies that the state may not directly produce the conditions of 
production in all cases.  The education and health service, and infrastructure 
such as roads and ports may be carried out publically or privately.  The private 
institution of the family, in addition to the state, is critical to the reproduction 
and socialisation of laborpower.  And environmental conditions are in many 
cases naturally occurring (such as in the case of mineral deposits) or produced 
privately (such as private timber plantations, for example).  But ‚whether the 
production conditions are produced by the state, the family or community, or 
capital itself, the state invariably regulates their production in direct or indirect 
ways‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 149).  It is ultimately the state’s responsibility to 
maintain or create the conditions under which the conditions of production will be 
produced and reproduced.  Aumeeruddy et al. (cited in O’Connor 1984, pp. 191-
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2) explain that ‚it is<a matter or reproducing not labour-power, but the 
conditions of existence of labour-power‛.  So while the function of the state pertains 
to the (re)production of the conditions of production, ‚the intervention of the 
state makes a difference in the form in which those<conditions are provided‛ 
(Pianta *quote+, O’Connor 1998, p. 149). 
 
This is a fundamental point, which O’Connor raises to account for the obvious 
plurality of forms of state intervention.  But there is room here to use the 
concept more systematically to capture what is distinctive about the state’s 
relationship to the conditions of production under neoliberalism: a neoliberal 
state could be thought of as one that remains responsible for the regulation of 
the conditions of production, but increasingly ensures only the ‘conditions 
under which’ the conditions of production are reproduced, and seeks to 
withdraw from directly reproducing these conditions.  That is to say that the 
state continues to regulate, but reduces its role in directly providing or 
producing the workforce, infrastructure and natural resources and carrying out 
the rehabilitation of the environment.   
 
This tendency has in fact been recognised by theorists of neoliberalism.  The 
privatisation and outsourcing of previously in-house state functions is a major 
feature of the neoliberal state (Miraftab 2004; Picciotto 2011). This transition has 
been described as a shift from the state ‘rowing’ to ‘steering’ (Osborne & 
Gaebler 1992; Miraftab 2004, p. 93; Picciotto 2011, p. 91), a process in which 
private contractors gradually take over functions previously carried out by 
public servants.  In relation to the environment, Grabosky describes this 
phenomena (in his case favourably) as ‚governing at a distance‛ (1995, p. 197).  
As later chapters will suggest, carbon pricing is an example of how states are 
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attempting to ‘steer’ climate policy while refusing to ‘row’ by investing directly 
in a technological transition. 
 
The other way in which O’Connor’s work could to be extended is to account for 
the fact that ‘the state’ only exists in an international system of states, which are 
in competition (Barker 1991).  The Bay Area Kapitalistate Group (of which 
O’Connor is a member) points out that ‚O’Connor does not consider in depth 
the international aspects of the state’s role‛ (BAKG 1975, p. 55).  They argue for 
the need to look at, among other things, the ‚Contradictory tendencies toward 
cooperation and competition‛ between powerful international states, and the 
‚conflict between-national corporations and national interests‛ (BAKG, p. 155).  
While some of O’Connor’s later work deals with themes such as imperialist 
international resource competition (1998, pp. 212-226), there is room to further 
explore the way the international state system acts as a straitjacket on the policy 
choices of each state.  As was noted earlier, the capitalist class exists as ‘warring 
brothers’ not only within, but between, nations.  When one state intensifies its 
ability to squeeze extra productivity from its workforce, or accesses new 
international markets for its exports, or conquers new territory, it generates a 
competitive response from other states which seek to keep up (Barker 1991, p. 
207).  Because each state is financially dependent on its national-capital, the 
force of international competition compels each state to submit to the laws of 
value, just as any capitalist firm submits before the force of the market. 
 
The neoliberal and international dimensions of the state are intimately linked, 
because neoliberal policies were employed by all states – though in an uneven 
fashion (Harvey 2005, p. 87) – in response to a global crisis of capitalism in the 
1970s which rendered the old institutions and of capitalism, and patterns of 
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regulation, unfit for the new needs of the economy (Davidson 2010; Harvey 
2005; Dunn, 2012).  As Davidson argues, ‚Neoliberalism represented a choice, 
but it was a choice increasingly difficult to avoid so long as the goal was the 
preservation and expansion of capitalism at all costs‛ (2010, p. 20).  While 
integration of the world economy does not leave states without autonomy, it 
does mean that ‚policy re-orientation seems likely to provoke considerable 
economic and social traumas‛ (Dunn 2012, p. 247).  The international economy 
acts as an ideological straitjacket on state players, as the need to maintain 
‘international competitiveness’ is used to justify the introduction of neoliberal 
policies.  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter the capitalist nation-state has been conceptualised as a system of 
institutions which, removed from the immediate short-term or sector-specific 
interests of capital, takes responsibility for managing the overall domestic and 
global conditions for accumulation.  This includes maintaining the 
preconditions for a functioning market: laborpower, infrastructure and 
environmental conditions.  Climate change poses a potential threat to 
accumulation conditions due, for example, to the costs associated with natural 
disasters, the risks posed to water and food security, the erosion of 
infrastructure, and the exacerbation of geopolitical tensions.  States would 
therefore be expected to have an interest in preventing further global warming.  
O’Connor’s observation that states are drawn into pursuing contradictory 
objectives because of the incoherence of the capitalist system means that such 
an expectation is still consistent with state behaviour aimed at securing 
international fossil fuel resources or the expansion of energy-intensive 
production.  
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To add to these observations, the state’s regulation of environmental conditions 
today takes place in a context in which each state has embraced a neoliberal 
growth regime in order to advance in the race between international capitals.  
This has involved, it has been proposed, states reducing their role in the direct 
responsibility for reproducing the conditions of production.  This is likely to 
intensify the contradictions that accompany managing capital accumulation, 
because the state is not only trying to manage the contradictions generated by 
the market, but is using this same market to carry out this management.  
Conflicts within the state system are also likely to be intensified, as sub-units of 
the state will be required to redress the unforeseen consequences of the 
activities of private or corporate entities tasked by the state with reproducing 
the conditions of production.  
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CHAPTER 3 
The three objectives of climate policy in Australia  
2006-2012 
 
This chapter assesses the key objectives which have shaped Australian 
government deliberations over climate policy, specifically between the years 
2006-2012.  These years have been chosen because they mark a period in which 
momentum surrounding the climate debate pushed policymakers towards 
more serious consideration (and eventual implementation) of climate policies3.  
An examination of key policy documents and department reports shows the 
recurrence of three key objectives, which this author has characterised as: 
1. to contribute to global efforts to reduce emissions, 
2. to maintain the integrity of Australia’s neoliberal growth strategy, 
3. and to safeguard Australia’s national competitiveness in the global 
economy. 
‘Neoliberal growth strategy’ refers to that set of reforms, institutions and 
economic policy objectives that have unpinned a global regime of accumulation 
since the 1980s, including but not limited to: a program of corporatisation and 
privatisation; wage-restraint and increased exploitation of labour; 
deregulation/re-regulation; and the dismantling of trade barriers and floating 
currency (Davidson 2010; Cahill 2012, p. 113).  Ideologically, neoliberalism ‚has 
                                                     
3 The scope of this chapter could be usefully extended to examine the longer history of climate 
policy development in Australia, given that ‚Awareness of the need to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions has been on the policy agenda of federal and state governments for a quarter of a 
century‛ (Burgmann & Baer 2012, p. 102).   
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now become the dominant framework through which social and economic 
policies are made across the capitalist world‛ (Cahill 2012, p. 120).   
 
Consistent with the account of state-capital relations developed in Chapter 2, 
each of the three listed objectives serves one overarching objective: to secure 
strong and sustained accumulation conditions for Australian capitalism.  
However, as was outlined, it is possible for the state to simultaneously pursue 
multiple, and potentially incompatible, objectives, each of which individually 
strengthen prospects for accumulation. This suggests two things: firstly, that 
reducing emissions is not the only objective, nor necessarily is it the most 
important one.  Indeed, the fact that the carbon price is not designed to reduce 
domestic emissions in the short term (Treasury 2011, p. 6) suggests a heavily 
compromised environmental agenda.  Secondly, climate policy has been 
developed according to three independent criteria, which policymakers have 
tried to make compatible.   
 
What follows is an account of carbon pricing in Australia which differs from the 
viewpoints of those scholars examined in Chapter 1 of this thesis.  Carbon 
pricing is here explained as the Australian state’s ‘common-sense’ climate 
policy, not because it is a political ‘fix’, nor because it is an environmentally 
effective policy, but because in theory it encompasses all the above objectives.  
This chapter will begin by locating the three objectives in the minutes and 
reports of the Multi-Party Climate Change Committee (MPCCC), the body that 
drafted the carbon tax policy.  It will then examine the prominence of each 
objective in policy documents from 2006 onwards.  
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3.1 Objectives of the carbon tax 
Gillard established the MPCCC shortly after the 2010 election, and its 
composition reflected that of the newly elected minority government, including 
independents Tony Windsor and Rob Oakeshott, Greens leader Bob Brown, 
Greens deputy leader Christine Milne, Climate Change Minister Greg Combet, 
Treasurer Wayne Swan, and the Prime Minister Julia Gillard (Rodgers 2010).  
The mandate of the committee, set by the Prime Minister, was to ‚explore 
options for the introduction of a carbon price‛ (‘Prime Minister Establishes 
Climate Change Committee’ 2010).  This criterion excluded consideration of 
policy options outside carbon pricing but was accepted by all participants.  In 
total seven different possible climate policies, all forms of carbon pricing, were 
considered (MPCCCa 2010).  These included ETSs and tax schemes based on 
energy-intensity levels, consumption, and the production of emissions-
intensive goods. But there was no consideration of a policy based on direct 
government funding or regulation as its key mechanism. 
   
The top principles which guided the MPCCC deliberations contribute to the 
case that three objectives - global emissions reduction, neoliberalism, and 
international competitiveness – provide the rationale for carbon pricing.  The 
top four of the MPCCC’s guiding principles were: 
1. environmental effectiveness 
2. economic efficiency 
3. budget neutrality 
4. and, competitiveness of Australian industry (MPCCCb 2010).   
Regarding the first principle – ‘environmental effectiveness’ – the minutes from 
the seven meetings show an acceptance of scientific common-sense on the 
progress and dangers of climate change, as well as a commitment to meeting 
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Australia’s emissions reduction target ‚as a Party to the Kyoto Protocol and a 
signatory to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change‛ 
(MPCCCa 2010).  ‘Economic efficiency’, the second principle, is a proxy for the 
neoliberal agenda.  The MPCCC makes this clear when it asserts that as part of 
the economic efficiency principle climate policies must be ‚consistent with 
Australia’s broader economic reform agenda‛ (MPCCCb 2010).   
 
The MPCCC was clear that it ‚supports Australia’s international objectives and 
obligations‛ (MPCCCb 2010).  It stated that: 
Cuts in global pollution are necessary to reduce the risks posed by 
unmitigated climate change<*and+ For Australia, these risks are 
large, threatening our economy<and our way of life (MPCCCb 
2010).   
In weighing up the relative benefits of different policy options, outcomes such 
as ‚certainty over absolute carbon pollution targets‛ and ‚incentives for 
participants to find lower emissions production processes‛ were considered 
advantageous, while outcomes such as ‚does not limit carbon pollution in the 
near term‛ and ‚uncertain abatement outcomes‛ (MPCCCa 2010) were 
considered disadvantageous.  For example, one of the main disadvantages 
listed for a consumption based pricing scheme was that it does not provide any 
incentive for export industries to limit emissions (MPCCCa 2010).  An 
emissions-reduction objective was clearly articulated in the MPCCC’s 
deliberations.  
 
However, what is also clear from the MPCCC minutes is that the Committee 
regarded anything that would increase the overall ‘cost’ to the economy as a 
serious disadvantage.  Any extra abatement above and beyond what is strictly 
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required by Australia’s formal commitment was regarded as an unnecessary 
expense.  For example one of the cited disadvantages of a carbon tax was the 
‘fiscal risk’ posed by the government, rather than the market, setting the price: 
If a carbon tax rate were set too high, it would divert resources 
into reducing carbon pollution beyond the level required to meet 
Australia’s international targets, raising excess revenue and 
imposing an unnecessary cost on the economy (MPCCCa 2010).   
The language of ‘cost’ and the objective of a ‘low-cost’ policy has been used to 
advocate market solutions as opposed to regulatory ones, because it is asserted 
that the market is most capable of finding an efficient, and therefore least cost, 
way to undertake a transition (Garnaut 2008, 2011; Stern 2006).  This is an 
ideological position which ignores the unequal distribution of costs as they are 
passed down to consumers, capacity-to-pay considerations, and structural 
disruptions such as flow on effects to wages or job losses caused by industry 
closures (Spies-Butcher 2010, pp. 61-62).  Nor does it account for the substantial 
transaction costs in administering the policy, supplementary measures, or 
compensation (Rosewarne 2010).  Given this, the contention that market 
solutions do indeed deliver the lowest cost solution is a position consistent with 
a ‘neoliberal objective’. 
 
The commitment to this agenda was reflected in the panel of experts asked to 
advise the committee. The panel included Ross Garnaut, architect of the 
Garnaut Review 2008, advocate of a privatised electricity system, and ‚principle 
economic advisor to Australian Prime Minister R.J.L. Hawke from 1983 to 1985‛ 
(MPCCCc) during the years of neoliberal transformation in Australia; Patricia 
Faulkner, an expert in public-private partnerships (Burgmann & Baer 2012, p. 
94); and Rod Sims, also a key player in Australia’s neoliberal transformation 
(MPCCCc). 
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Advocates of market mechanisms, including Garnaut and Sims, have used the 
rationale of ‘low cost’ as the primary justification to promote the use of market 
mechanisms in place of regulatory policies.  In a presentation to the MPCCC, 
expert advisor Rod Sims concluded his presentation on the ‘Energy Market 
Outlook’ (2010) by stating: 
The logic of introducing a carbon price is that it will meet a given 
greenhouse gas reduction target at the lowest cost.  It follows that 
as we introduce a carbon price we should allow it to substitute for 
many other high cost schemes (Sims Outlook 2010, p. 2). 
Sims advocated a carbon price to substitute for all other policies.  The ‘high cost 
schemes’ he was referring to were ‚household solar and wind generation‛ 
(Sims 2010, p. 2) which he argued have contributed to a 30 per cent price rises in 
electricity over four years.  Pricing policies should, according to Sims, 
supersede policies aimed directly at introducing renewables, and the cost, 
rather than its actual effectiveness in reducing emissions, should be the 
benchmark for choosing policies.  
 
In addition to an environmental objective and a low-cost/neoliberal objective, 
the committee was also concerned with how Australia’s actions compare to 
international action.  We have already seen how ‘cost’ is interpreted as the 
disproportionate cost the Australian economy would bear if it went ahead of 
international action.  At its first meeting the committee requested that the 
Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency (DCCEE) provide a 
detailed analysis on ‚action that is being taken on climate change in key 
international economies‛ (MPCCCe 2011).  The final paper released by the 
MPCCC emphasised the need to predict and respond to ‚impacts of emission 
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mitigation policies in major economies on an industry-by-industry basis‛ 
(MPCCCe 2011) and set out its intention to enrol the Productivity Commission 
to quantify the mitigation policies in the world’s major economies, focusing in 
particular on the impacts on, and special considerations for, ‘Energy Intensive 
Trade Exposed’ (EITE) industries.  There is clearly a tension here between the 
committee’s concern for the competitiveness of highly polluting industry, its 
resolve not to take any action (in terms of expenditure on climate policies) 
beyond what is strictly necessary within the international context, and its 
concern to avoid the impact of climate change that will be detrimental to the 
economy and our ‘way of life’.   
 
3.2 Reducing global emissions 
The evidence indicates that policy makers have been aware of, and concerned 
by, the potential threat that climate change poses to the smooth maintenance of 
Australian capitalism for some time.  Climate change poses risks to Australian 
infrastructure and private property, water security and the agricultural sector, 
and will create new costs for the state.  The 2010 government report Adapting to 
Climate Change in Australia takes as its premise that ‚Already Australia faces a 
stark fact – the opportunity to avoid climate change altogether has passed‛ 
(DIICCSRTE 2010, p. 1).  The report examines the specific ways climate change 
will impact Australia.  Decreased rainfall, increased frequency and intensity of 
dry spells and bushfires, and the threat of rising sea levels to coastal cities are 
some of the dangers and costs being caused by already occurring climate 
change (DIICCSRTE 2010).  The report notes that climate change threatens 
national infrastructure – the ‘general condition’ of capitalism – and that this 
creates costs for the system: 
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<the magnitude of national wealth and critical infrastructure 
invested in the coastal zone warrants coastal management being 
given national priority status. Ports, airports, military facilities, as 
well as residential and other private infrastructure located in 
vulnerable coastal locations will require increased maintenance in 
the future (DIICCSRTE 2010, p. 12). 
This quote also suggests that private owners of this infrastructure are likely to 
be put offside, and demand the state spend money to protect their private 
property.  The report goes on to add that: 
The Commonwealth has a key interest in ensuring the owners of 
nationally significant infrastructure < provide continued and 
uninterrupted functioning of these assets, which are critical to 
supporting our national economy (DIICCSRTE 2010, p. 12). 
The adaptation report clearly presents climate change as being a threat to the 
national economy, the state, and private capital. 
 
Government concerns over the impact of climate change on water availability 
and security saw $12.9 billion invested in a Water for the Future program, in 
what was called the ‚single largest investment in climate change adaptation‛ 
(DIICCSRTE 2010).  The program, to prepare the country for the consequences 
of climate change, was to establish a ‘Basin Plan’ for water diversion from the 
Murray-Darling Basin; better forecast and measure water availability; assist 
farmers in adaptation measures; and investigate potential development of 
water resources in northern Australia (DSEWPC 2010). 
 
Earlier, in 2006, Howard commissioned a Task Group, chaired by the Secretary 
of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Peter Shergold, ‚to advise 
on the nature and design of a workable global emissions trading system in 
which Australia would be able to participate‛ (Task Group 2007, p. 1).  The 
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‘Shergold report’, as it came to be called, expresses more concern for how 
climate policy will affect the economy than for how climate change will affect it.  
Nonetheless it takes as its starting point that: 
Australia has a vital interest in the form of any emerging global 
response. Given our exposure to the impacts of climate change we 
want an approach that is effective (Task Group 2007, p. 6) 
While questioning Australia’s responsibility to contribute to a global response, 
it also acknowledges that there is a ‚premium on policies that protect against 
the most severe impacts‛ and that consistent with this view Australia should be 
active in working towards a ‚comprehensive international framework‛ to 
ensure global action is taken (Task Group 2007, p. 15). 
 
The Shergold report was compiled by twelve individuals, including several 
Secretaries of Department alongside the Chief Executive of Xstrata Coal, the 
Managing Director of International Power, Director of the Australian Pipeline 
Trust, Chairman of the Qantas Board, and the Director of BHP Billiton Limited 
(Task Group 2007, pp. 145-6).  That the group was dominated by individuals 
with interests in the fossil fuel industry is suspect. However, this may also 
reflect some awareness regarding the threats climate change may pose to their 
individual sectoral interests. 
 
In 2006, according to Burgmann and Baer, ‚mainstream attitudes underwent a 
seismic shift as authoritative scientific pronouncements that human-induced 
climate change was a considerable problem altered the thinking of large 
numbers of people‛ (2012, p. 68).  The release of Al Gore’s film An Inconvenient 
Truth (2006) and the publication of The Stern Review (2006) were symbolic of the 
mainstreaming of environmentalism.  This was accompanied by a change in the 
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way the problem was framed:  from a threat to the environment and humanity 
to a cost to the economy.  Burgmann and Baer explain that: 
An important reason for its impact is that the Stern Review 
approached the problem not from a green agenda but from a 
profit-oriented cost-benefit analysis.  The central message was that 
‘The benefit of strong, early action on climate change outweigh 
the costs.’  Mitigation was ‘a highly productive investment’.  It 
implied strongly that any logical businessperson should favour 
immediate far-reaching regulation and restraints (2012, p. 11). 
This way of framing climate change carried through into the 2007 election.  
Rudd and Labor increasingly spoke of the need for environmental reform, first 
and foremost in order to maintain a stable market economy.  In Rudd’s first 
speech in parliament as leader of the opposition he stated: 
<when it comes to our Labor values of equity, sustainability and 
compassion<they are values necessary to enhance the market 
itself.  If we do not take sustainability and climate change 
seriously, what will happen to the future of the market economy? 
...If we do not rescue this planet from itself in terms of the damage 
being done to it by unrestrained market capitalism, let me tell: 
you [sic] the entire market system ultimately will fragment (Rudd 
2013). 
Inside ruling circles there was a growing concern for the cost that climate 
change posed to the system itself, and this created serious debate regarding the 
cost of acting on climate change versus the cost of not acting.  The consequence 
of this was that, while climate action became more mainstream and acceptable 
to business, it also served to legitimise and strengthen the neoliberal constraints 
that were placed on possible solutions.   
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3.3 Safeguarding neoliberalism 
Chapter 2 suggested that carbon pricing is an example of how, under 
neoliberalism, states are less frequently engaged directly in providing and 
maintaining the conditions of production, and increasingly ‘steer’ the private 
sector to carry out these functions.  In both cases the state is intervening into the 
economy, but the form of its intervention is different.  This is consistent with the 
discourse which has characterised climate policy in Australia.  The Garnaut 
Climate Change Review (2008) and the updated Garnaut Review 2011 are 
illustrative of this, highlighting the importance that governments ‚Don’t pick 
winners‛ (2008, p. 317).  Garnaut is one of the authoritative voices on economic 
responses to climate change in Australia.  His reports were commissioned by 
the government; and he has worked in government under both parties.  His 
positions are reflective of, and influential on, the views of political and business 
representatives.  Examining his Reviews allows for insight into the broader 
objectives which are informing the Australian state.  
 
The Garnaut Review (2008) specifies that ‚the primary policy objective must be 
to meet a specified trajectory of emissions reductions at the lowest possible 
cost‛ (Garnaut 2008, p. 310).   Cost is the central criterion by which all policy 
options are compared.  The case for mitigation itself is demonstrated with a 
cost-benefit analysis, which models the impact of non-mitigation compared to 
mitigation to 550ppm and 450ppm levels of CO2.  This is calculated in GNP 
terms over the entire 21st century.  In the report, cost is measured in aggregate 
terms, as a ‘cost’ to the national economy, expressed in GNP.  The cost referred 
to, then, is not the cost born by individuals and households, or even the cost 
born by individual businesses, but the total reduction in growth rate that can be 
attributed to the chosen policy.  Thus a ‘high cost’ policy is defined as one in 
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which the economy will grow more slowly than it otherwise would.  As Guy 
Pearse points out, ‚not one credible piece of economic research suggests that 
making deep cuts in emissions by 2050 would cause even a temporary 
recession‛ (Pearse 2009, p. 23).  But Garnaut considers it crucial that any climate 
policy results in ‚as little disruption as possible and at least cost to the overall 
economy‛ (2008, p. 315).   
 
The Garnaut reviews highlight that avoiding costs and securing growth are 
intimately tied to pursuing neoliberal objectives, including prioritising 
productivity growth, enforcing flexible labour practices through any transition, 
and extending the privatisation of the electricity sector (e.g Garnaut 2011, p. 67; 
Garnaut 2008, p. 468).  In his 2011 updated Review, Garnaut dedicates several 
pages to bemoaning the slowing rate of productivity growth in the Australian 
economy.  This, he says, ‚is the problematic political context of the climate 
change policy discussion‛ (2011, p. xvi).  Garnaut is as concerned about the 
state of the economy as he is about the impact of climate change.  Looking back 
to the 1970s, the lessons to be taken, apparently, are that: 
The wonders of the free market, and the inspiration, energy and 
hard work of the Australian private sector, took businesses to 
global success that neither politician nor bureaucrat could have 
picked (2011, p. 67).  
Addressing climate change presents a policy dilemma which has the potential 
to either entrench or disrupt historical neoliberal trends, and Garnaut is 
determined not to let it be the latter.  His take-home point is that we should not 
make the mistake of being tempted by the ‘regulatory’ option.  The Garnaut 
Review 2011 is, in Garnaut’s own words ‚a story of how market-based 
approaches to mitigation can bring out the best in Australians, and a return to 
regulatory approaches the worst‛ (2011, pp. xx).  He argues that climate action 
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should be tied to other policies which enhance freedom for capital.  One of his 
specific agendas is to push for the completion of the privatisation of the 
electricity sector (Garnaut 2008, p. 468).  Later in this thesis it will be argued 
that, in fact, the privatisation of electricity creates barriers to speedy, effective 
and indeed low-cost climate policy. 
 
The prioritisation of a solution which presents as little cost or disruption to the 
national economy, and hence safeguards current neoliberal policies and 
processes, extends beyond the Garnaut reviews, as has already been shown by 
the MPCCC reports.  Similarly the Productivity Commission (2011), which was 
asked by the MPCCC to prepare the report Carbon Emission Policies in Key 
Economies explains that it has ‚interpreted ‘effective’ carbon prices broadly to 
mean the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions‛ (XIV), and in comparing 
policies across countries they compare the cost per tonne of abatement.  Thus a 
small amount of abatement at a low unit cost is considered equivalent to, or 
even better than substantial abatement at a high cost: 
Australia’s commitment of resources<was much the same as for 
South Korea and China. But relative to South Korea, Australia’s 
suite of measures was much more cost effective and produced 
proportionately more abatement (Productivity Comission 2011, p. 
148). 
By this measurement Australia is considered to be doing quite well, because its 
relative cost of abatement is at the lower end of the scale.  The absurdity of this 
should alert us to contradictions between the two objectives of emissions 
reduction and neoliberal objectives.   
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The objectives which lie at the heart of the Garnaut Reviews were also central to 
the Report of the Task Group on Emissions Trading commissioned by Howard, 
which similarly argues against a regulatory approach: 
Regulation places a significant impost on business enterprises.  
Subsidies risk distorting economic decision-making.  It is better 
for the Australian Government to establish a long-term 
aspirational goal and a trajectory to achieve that goal, establish the 
framework within which the price of carbon will be set, and then 
allow the market to respond in the most efficient and effective 
way to the new settings (Task Group 2007, pp. 8-9).  
It is not surprising that the logic underpinning climate policy during the 
Howard years shares much common ground with Labor’s approach: not only 
are both parties committed to a neoliberal agenda, but the head of the 
secretariat for the Shergold Report, Dr Martin Parkinson, played a central role 
in Treasury in carrying out the economic modeling and advising the 
government on the carbon tax from a Treasury perspective (Senate Inquiry 
2011, p. 2).  The bipartisanship alludes to the deep consensus in state politics to 
pursue the neoliberal objective.  It runs far deeper than party divisions.  
Carbon pricing has been constructed within an ideologically neoliberal 
framework, and is designed to be structurally compatible with a neoliberal 
economy.  
 
3.4 International competitiveness: how to be a ‘relatively fast follower’ 
The third consideration which has shaped climate policy is global competition.  
The state has competitive advantages it wants to preserve.  Thus Howard gave 
these terms of reference to his Task Group: 
Australia enjoys major competitive advantages through the 
possession of large reserves of fossil fuels and uranium. <these 
advantages must be preserved (Task Group 2007, p. 1). 
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The Shergold report also notes that ‚Access to low-cost energy is a source of 
competitive advantage for Australia, contributing to the development of a 
range of energy-intensive industries‛ (Task Group 2007, pp. 10-11).  According 
to Pearse, access to fossil fuels and cheap electricity in Australia has 
underpinned a long-term growth strategy based on commodity exports and 
attracting investment for energy-intensive production processes, such as metal 
smelting (2009, p. 25).  A desire to provide emissions intensive trade exposed 
(EITE) industries almost total exemption from the carbon tax (Commonwealth 
of Australia 2011, p. 55) is indicative of the way these concerns continue to 
shape the strategy of the Australian state.  The Australian government keeps a 
close eye on electricity prices and is concerned about how high prices will 
impact business competitiveness (for example, see Rudd ‘The Australian 
Economy in Transition’ 2013).  There is a tension between the government’s 
policy of putting a price on emissions which has the effect of raising electricity 
prices, and its desire to keep these prices low (for industry) for national 
competitiveness.   
 
Because Australia’s ‘competitive advantage’ in coal and cheap electricity is 
intimately tied to its export industries, maintaining this advantage is contingent 
on what actions and investment decisions are made by Australia’s trade 
partners.  This means that the Australian state must also, potentially, ‘hedge its 
bets’ by planning for the possibility that the global economy will shift more 
decisively on climate change.  Treasury spokesperson Dr Martin Parkinson 
addressed this in a senate committee inquiry into the carbon tax undertaken in 
2011:   
<our industrial structure<is in fact highly vulnerable to what 
other countries decide to do.  If other countries decide to put 
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penalties on high-emissions intensive production and we, because 
80 per cent of our electricity broadly comes from coal fired power 
plants, are selling product that has high-embedded emissions in 
it, that will be a threat to our capacity to export (Senate Select 
Committee 2011, p. 21). 
The consequent difficulties are candidly put by Parkinson, who highlights the 
impossibility of dealing with the problem by taking decisive action one way or 
the other.  Rather he advises that the Australian government position itself as a 
‘relatively fast follower’ of international action: 
This is a collective action problem. Ultimately, we have to have it 
addressed at a global level but, if we do not start, then the 
adjustment process for us is bigger and more complex and more 
expensive later. So the issue is how to balance starting when you 
are not actually the leader. <so how do we get the balance right 
to be a relatively fast follower, to start the process of adjustment in 
a measured way and to retain the flexibility to recalibrate in the 
light of international developments? (Senate Select Committee 
2011, p. 32). 
The Australian state, then, must be neither too far ahead of nor behind the major 
international players.  This speaks directly to the competitive and anarchic 
nature of capitalist production, in which, because there is no scope for economic 
planning, each state is left to second guess what every other state will do. 
 
The Australian state also has an interest in being at international negotiations to 
design a policy which suits its national economic interests, and it may not be in 
a position to do this if it is painted as recalcitrant on climate change.  The 
Shergold report considered the ‘national benefits’ of taking early action on 
climate change.  These included an improved environment for long-term 
investment, a greater influence over emerging international climate solutions, 
and greater ability to develop low-emissions technologies (Task Group 2007, p. 
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84).  The need to attract investment led the report to conclude that business may 
prefer clear action it can account for, rather than deal with the possibility of 
unknown action in the future: 
Delaying further action in order to safeguard Australia’s 
competitive advantage will increasingly become a less effective 
approach if it increases investor uncertainty in the very industries 
the strategy is designed to assist (Task Group 2007, p. 86). 
Investment uncertainty continues to be of great concern to business groups in 
Australia.  A survey conducted by the group ‘Businesses for a Clean Economy’ 
concluded that business favour for a carbon price was driven by the desire for 
certainty  (B4CE Media Release 2013).  It found that 64.7 per cent of respondents 
supported an emissions trading scheme, 28.8 per cent a fixed price, and only 3.3 
per cent said they did not support a carbon price of any variety (B4CE Media 
Release 2013, p. 2).  These figures suggest it is not price certainty (for which a 
carbon tax would be preferable), but the certainty of having a climate policy, 
which can then be accommodated to, that is significant for business.  This 
included sectors with strong fossil fuel interests.  According to the survey 
‚business supports the need for a long term price signal on carbon to provide 
confidence in investment decision-making and to enable a transition toward a 
cleaner economy‛ (B4CE 2013, p. i). 
 
It is clear that maintaining ‘national competitiveness’ is no straightforward task 
for the Australian state, as it is highly contingent on international 
developments.  Some considerations pull in the direction of protecting the fossil 
fuel and cheap electricity ‘advantage’, while others push in the direction of 
preparing for genuine international climate action by dissociating Australia’s 
growth from its reliance on fossil fuels.  
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In response, government policies have been calculated and adjusted to stay in 
line with international carbon prices.  For example, in August 2012 the 
government announced European Climate Commission had agreed to partially 
link the Australian ETS to the EU ETS from 2013.  In order to facilitate the 
speeding up of this process, the plan to set floor and ceiling prices – a minimum 
and maximum price within which the value of carbon permits would fluctuate 
– would be abandoned from the legislation (SMH 2012).  A government 
Regulatory Impact Statement (DCCEE n.d.) on the proposal for a partial link, lists 
one of the objectives of linking as ‚to provide Australian liable entities with 
secure access to a wider range of credible international emissions units‛ 
(DCCEE n.d., p. 3).  It states that Australia has a ‘national interest’ in 
establishing an effective global carbon market because this will ‚reduce global 
and Australian abatement costs by ensuring that the cheapest abatement 
opportunities are pursued first regardless of where in the world they occur‛ 
(DCCEE n.d., p. 2).  It seems that part of the appeal of carbon pricing for the 
Australian government is that it is flexible to international developments.  It 
provides an ideal way for governments to minimise the cost burden they 
assume relative to the rest of the world.  
 
3.5 Conclusion 
The Howard government flirted with, and the Rudd and Gillard governments 
embraced, carbon pricing, in the hope of resolving the conundrum that both 
climate change and climate policies could pose a threat to the regime of growth 
in Australian based on a neoliberalised economy and a competitive advantage 
in cheap fossil fuel energy.  The criterion of a ‘low cost’ climate policy, and the 
insistence that the state’s intervention should be limited to facilitating carbon 
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markets, reflects the prioritisation of the ‘neoliberal’ objective.  Judging climate 
policy according to the low-cost criteria leads to conclusions which are not 
environmentally effective, as was seen in the example of the Productivity 
Commission praising Australia’s low levels of abatement for being cost 
effective and producing ‘proportionately’ more abatement than other countries.  
The following chapter will investigate examples of contradictions that have 
emerged through the implementation of the carbon tax in Australia as a 
consequence of the objectives outlined in this chapter, and also as a result of the 
incoherence of the state system itself. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A state of contradiction: climate policy in action 
 ‚Australia’s journey towards a lower-emissions economy has begun with the 
introduction of the carbon price and other supporting measures under the 
Australian Government’s Clean Energy Future Plan. We must now let our energy 
and carbon markets operate as intended to determine the nation’s future energy mix<‛ 
(Italics added, DRET 2012, p. ix). 
 
This thesis has so far argued that capitalist states pursue contradictory 
objectives in their attempts to ensure good conditions for accumulation, and 
that these contradictions are intensified by the neoliberal transformation of state 
activity and by the impact of global competition.  In Chapter 3, these two 
factors were shown to have shaped the Australian state’s preference for carbon 
pricing and undermined efforts to avert the negative impacts of climate change 
on economic growth.  
 
This analysis will now examine the actual outcomes of climate policy on the 
provision of electricity in Australia since the time the carbon price was 
introduced (1 July 2012).  Electricity generation is a major contributor to carbon 
emissions with drive global warming.  Energy security and the costs of 
electricity supply are important to national competitiveness for the Australian 
economy.  The history of corporatisation and privatisation of the electricity 
sector makes it an insightful example of how state-economy relations have 
shifted under neoliberalism.  For these reasons, the electricity sector provides 
good illustrations of the tensions in state policy responses to climate change.  
The Energy White Paper 2012 (DRET 2012) is the entry point to an examination of 
these issues.  This analysis will elaborate on the contention proposed in Chapter 
2 that the state is not a cohesive body and is in reality a ‘state-system’.   
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Three examples show that Australia’s climate policy has favoured an 
accumulation regime based on fossil fuels.  Firstly, concern for national 
competitiveness has driven the government to compensate emissions-intensive 
trade exposed (EITE) industries, such as brown coal generators in Victoria. This 
compensation is designed to shield these generators from the real cost of carbon 
pricing.  Secondly, support for the private sector, which will fulfil future energy 
needs in Australia, has been favoured over the development of renewable 
energy sources.  Bodies such as the Australian Renewable Energy Agency 
(ARENA) have received token funding (by comparison), which is insufficient to 
make renewables viable as the primary future fuel source. Thirdly, conflicting 
capital interests are embodied within the incoherent state system.   The NSW-
government Treasury campaigned to protect local coal-fired power assets, 
demanding compensation from the federal government under Gillard for 
damages associated with the carbon price, and called for the Renewable Energy 
Target (RET) to be overturned.  In each of these cases, the contradictions 
presented to the state were resolved in favour of the continuation of emissions 
intensive production.   
 
4.1 An electricity advantage 
Electricity generation is fundamental to a modern capitalist economy.  It is a 
‘general’ condition of capital – one of the three conditions of production 
identified by O’Connor.  As of 2012, three quarters of Australia’s greenhouse 
gas emissions came from the energy sector.  Electricity generation is the ‚single 
largest contributor‛, responsible for 38 per cent of emissions (DRET 2012, p. 20).  
Transitioning the electricity sector to generate from renewable sources will be 
essential to any substantial emissions reduction program in Australia (Garnaut 
2011, p. 149).  O’Connor highlights that the conflicting needs of a capitalist 
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economy can manifest ‚within and between state-produced-or-regulated 
conditions of production themselves‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 150).  In the case of 
electricity, the maintenance of this general condition of production is directly 
opposed to the maintenance of a stable atmosphere.   
 
This contradiction is expressed in the Energy White Paper 2012 – a strategic 
document outlining a four-year energy plan.  It outlines three ‘intersecting 
factors’ which should determine Australia’s energy future: 
 the need to deliver secure, reliable and competitively priced 
energy for a growing population and economy  
 the further expansion of our energy exports to Asia and other 
growth markets  
 the need to become more energy efficient across the economy and 
to dramatically reduce carbon emissions and transform to a clean 
energy economy  
(DRET 2012, p. x). 
The White Paper sets out a strategy ‚to retain our hard-won competitive 
advantage in reliable and competitively priced energy‛ (DRET 2012, p. ix).  It 
also argues for the need to supply ‚competitively priced and reliable supplies 
of electricity‛ to industries such as ‚plastics, chemicals, alumina and steel‛ 
(DRET 2012, p. 36).   
 
The reliance of Australia’s growth strategy on cheap energy can be traced back 
to a convergence in the 1980s of neoliberal reform and an enhanced role for 
energy exports.  The process of lowering trade tariffs was beneficial to the 
mining sector, since it opened up new avenues for exports (Pearse 2009, p. 25).  
This coincided with growing international demand for coal in the wake of the 
1970s oil shocks (Pearse 2009, p. 25).  Australia’s low electricity prices made it 
well placed to develop industries such as aluminium smelting, which are highly 
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emissions intensive (Nelson et al. 2012, p. 217).  In the early 1990s the Keating 
government consciously began to exploit the ‘comparative advantage’ in cheap 
electricity, seeking to attract multinational investors (Pearse 2009, p. 26).  These 
companies tended to produce mainly for export, making them ‚‘trade exposed’ 
and sensitive to any increase in electricity prices‛ (Nelson et al 2012, p. 217).  It 
is evident that emissions intensive electricity production is built into Australia’s 
national competitiveness agenda.  This is reflected in compensation to trade 
exposed industries to give them ‚94.5 per cent shielding from the carbon price‛ 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. 55).  The CEP also included $300 million 
of assistance for the steel industry (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. 133).   
 
4.2 Compensating capital in Victoria 
The Energy White Paper 2012 shows a strong awareness of the threat of 
accelerating global warming.  Alongside this it makes clear its commitment to 
principles of neoliberalism, which dictate that the market will make decisions 
about the future direction of investment.  This leads it to a counterintuitive 
position.  On the one hand the White Paper notes the ‘expectation’ that the 
electricity sector’s emissions will reduce by 76 per cent by 2050 (DRET 2012, p. 
xi).  It also acknowledges the problem of ‘lock in’ of capital stock, both in 
Australia and globally: 
The IEA has estimated that around 80% of global carbon dioxide 
emissions allowable under a scenario that keeps atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations under 450 parts per million and 
global warming under 2°C is already locked in through existing 
capital stock (such as power plants, factories and buildings) 
(DRET 2012, p. xvii).   
But far from concluding that there is a need to prevent further lock in of 
emissions intensive capital, the report relegates the role of government to 
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ensure maximum options are available under a ‚portfolio approach within a 
well-functioning market-based framework‛ (DRET 2012, p. xvii).  No options, 
including gas, or carbon capture and storage should be ruled out of 
consideration (DRET 2012, p. xvii). 
 
The reliance of the energy sector on private capital reinforces the need to 
maintain a favourable investment climate for business.  As the White Paper 
puts it: 
Our ability to deliver investment in a timely and cost-effective 
way will depend critically on access to finance and capital.  Given 
the relatively small pool of Australian investors with deep 
experience in greenfield energy investments, it is likely that a 
significant proportion of the required capital— debt and equity—
will need to be sourced from overseas.  The footloose and 
competitive nature of foreign capital means that Australia must 
maintain attractive and stable investment and policy frameworks 
(DRET 2012, p. xii).  
An ‘attractive and stable investment and policy framework’ is code for 
deregulated prices and a free-market for electricity.  During the 1990s 
Australia’s electricity market underwent restructuring through the 
commercialisation, corporatisation and, in some cases, privatisation of 
electricity assets (Chester 2007, p. 983).  The NEM, a wholesale electricity 
market, was established in December 1998.  The OECD and the International 
Energy Agency (IEA) have cited Australia’s electricity restructuring as a success 
story and role model for other nations (Chester 2007, p. 981, 995).  A 
government concerned to attract future investment in the industry will want to 
maintain these ‘good’ international standards. 
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But what is good for business is not, it turns out, good for the climate.  The 
privatisation of electricity in Victoria has created political and financial 
obstacles to government climate policy.  On September 5 2012 the Minister for 
Energy and Resources Martin Ferguson announced that the Contracts For 
Closures program (CFC), originally part of the CEP, would be abandoned.   The 
policy was designed to ‚support the closure of around 2,000 megawatts of 
highly emissions-intensive generation capacity in Australia by 2020‛ (DI 2013) 
through the government buying out this capacity and closing it down.  But 
having private capital as an intermediary between the government’s climate 
policy and electricity production has undermined this environmental policy4.  
The government abandoned the negotiations because ‚there remains a material 
gap between the level of compensation generators have sought and what the 
Government is prepared to pay‛ (Ferguson 2012). 
 
This material gap was exacerbated by the federal government’s own 
compensation arrangements under the carbon price.  A recent study 
commissioned by Environment Victoria carried out by Carbon & Energy Markets 
(CME 2013), concluded that the impacts of government compensation to 
brown-coal fired power stations in Victoria significantly pushed up the price of 
buying out these power-stations, and, ironically, the promise of compensation 
until 2016-7 created a direct financial incentive for the power stations to stay in 
operation for longer: 
Eligible generators will not receive compensation if they close 
their plant permanently, but will continue to receive 
compensation if the plant remains available to produce, even if it 
does not produce. This compensation averages between $120m 
                                                     
4 The CFC scheme was itself problematic, given it was compensating private owners with tax-payer money to entice 
them to give up a socially harmful (Courtice 2012).  Nevertheless this example highlights the difficulties that would 
confront the state were it to push for the further phasing out of emissions-intensive industries.  
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per year for Loy Yang B to $275m per year (for Hazelwood) 
during the fixed price period. It seems very unlikely that the 
generators will close permanently and sacrifice receipt of these 
payments during the fixed price period (CME 2013, p. 23). 
Due to an average price rise pass through rate of 111 per cent (reduced down to 
‚a little over 100% after accounting for the cost of emission permits‛ (CME 
2013, p. 3) of the cost of the carbon tax, the study found that Victorian brown 
coal generators ‚can expect to accrue additional operating profits somewhere in 
the range of $2.3bn to $5.4bn (present value) depending on emission prices in 
future‛ (CME 2013, p. 5).  The lower figure corresponds to a lower carbon price, 
meaning that the higher the price, the greater the windfall profits for the companies.  
Contrary to any aim of reducing carbon emissions, the Victorian coal fired 
power stations have become more profitable under the carbon price package.   
 
This example highlights the way that a neoliberalised state, separated from, but 
still responsible for, direct control of energy provision struggles with 
contradictions that emerge between providing favourable conditions for 
production and simultaneously providing effective climate change policy.  An 
report by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), commissioned by 
the DCCEE to explore scenarios of a 100 per cent renewably resourced 
electricity market made ‚No consideration< *of the+ costs of government 
policies that that may be needed to drive the transition‛ (AEMO 2013, p. 9).  Yet 
we have seen that the cost of undertaking even a small part of this transition by 
closing the oldest, most polluting coal-fired power stations in the country 
resulted in the federal government abandoning its attempt. 
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The decision to give such large quantities of compensation to emissions 
intensive power stations was based on concerns about energy security, and, as 
outlined by AEMO, the Australian Energy Market Commission (AEMC), and 
the Investment Reference Group (IRG), securing the investment of private 
capital is a key energy security concern.  The government set aside an Energy 
Security Fund of $5.5 billion for ‘transitional assistance’ and sought advice on 
‚whether significant energy security risks would arise if a price on carbon 
emissions<was introduced without providing any financial assistance<to 
existing, highly emissions intensive, generators during a transitional phase‛ 
(Pierce 2011, p. 1). 
 
AEMO and AMEC responded emphasising the risk of adverse flow-on effects 
throughout the energy market.  Rising costs and reduction in asset value for 
one generator may cause ‚other market participants [to] become very cautious 
about continuing to contract with the affected companies until their future 
financial position becomes clear and more stable‛ (Pierce 2011, p. 2).  The 
AEMO noted the separate risks of ‚potential premature departure of high 
emission plants and/or delay in new investment‛ that could be associated with 
price shock from the carbon tax (Zema 2011, p. 2).  It further noted that:  
In the longer term, it must be recognised that the NEM requires a 
very large quantity of investment to transform itself away from its 
present status as the developed world's most carbon intensive 
generation fleet. Investor confidence in the Australian energy 
market is key to attracting the necessary funds and a significant 
contributor to the cost of capital. If the cost of capital increases 
due to these factors, not only would consumer prices be higher 
but there would be a substantive risk that reliability would reduce 
as a result of delayed investment (Zema 2011, p. 3). 
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This comment exposes the degree of dependency by government on private 
capital to invest in future electricity generation and therefore ensure the 
nation’s future energy security.   
 
IRG was commissioned by the Commonwealth Minister for Resources and 
Energy to report ‚on the extent to which policy uncertainty is resulting in 
delays or sub-optimal investment and the potential implications for energy 
security and reliability‛ (IRG 2011, p. 12).  The IRG wrote that:  
While it may be possible to attract some new investment into the 
Australian energy sector, it is likely that existing participants will 
need to play a major role in future investments. The recent New 
South Wales electricity privatisation process shows the difficulty 
of attracting new investors <This was seen in heavily discounted 
asset values, substantially attributable to the expectation of a 
carbon price being imposed (IRG 2011, p. 7). 
It continued by pointing out that:  
These investors are mobile and can deploy their capital in many 
countries, so will seek out investments that best match their risk 
reward preferences. If the uncertainty about the carbon price in 
Australia is too great then these investors will take up other 
opportunities, thereby limiting the availability of financing in 
Australia and raising the price of the available financing and 
limiting the quality and capability of the investors (IRG 2011, pp. 
7-8). 
This highlights the conflict between a rising price actually creating a 
disincentive for investment in fossil fuels, and the desire of the state to secure 
investment in the sector.  If renewables factor in here at all, it is as an equal 
‘competitor’ that needs to be commercially viable and profitable enough to 
attract the same kind of capital that flows to emissions intensive industries.  
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4.3 Renewables—profitable yet? 
There was some effort by the Rudd and Gillard governments to speed up the 
rollout of renewable energy through funding bodies ARENA and the Clean 
Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC), responsible for $3.2 billion and $10 billion 
respectively, although only half of the latter was strictly for renewable energy 
(Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. 64).  In addition the RET had already 
been ‚legislated to ensure that 20 per cent of Australia’s electricity supply 
comes from renewable sources by 2020‛ (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. 
66). 
 
Even in its renewable energy policies these governments remained oriented to 
market concerns, and employed a good deal of ‘steering’ and a limited amount 
of ‘rowing’ of investment in clean technology.  ARENA and the CEFC were set 
up to ‘encourage’ private sector developments, and not to undertake large scale 
investments, let alone economy-wide planning.  ARENA’s objectives are to 
‚improve the competitiveness of renewable energy technologies‛ and to 
‚increase the supply of renewable energy in Australia‛ (ARENA 2013, p. 1).  
But, importantly, it ‚does not have the resources to fully finance large projects‛ 
(ARENA 2013, p. 2).  The CEFC, similarly, explains that its role is to ‚catalyse 
and leverage an increased flow of funds for the commercialisation and 
deployment of Australian based renewable energy‛ (CEFC 2013).  The CEFC is 
not there to fully fund renewable energy, but only to assist private capital to do 
so.  
 
One of the consequences of this structure for funding renewables was that the 
large scale solar project Solar Oasis collapsed after ARENA withdrew $60 
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million of government funding due to the project’s inability to raise sufficient 
private capital (Edis 2013).  The origins of the project go back as far as the 2004 
Energy White Paper, which advised the Australian government to ‚focus on 
developing new technology breakthroughs that would deliver step-changes in 
cost or reliability‛ (Edis 2013).  Grants were issued to build and expand 
prototypes for the project in 2005, 2007, 2010 and 2012, under swiftly changing 
funding bodies.  To get to commercial stage, Solar Oasis required $170 million 
of capital beyond government funding.  The failure of the project to attract 
sufficient private capital determined its fate.  By contrast, OneSteel, a Steel 
manufacturing company also in Whyalla, received $120 million of the 
government’s $300 million steel assistance package (Taylor 2011). 
 
The overall consequence of the way these operations have been structured is 
that while ARENA and the RET have gone some way to encourage the 
expansion of renewables they have not yet made inroads into reversing the 
expansion of fossil fuel electricity.  The carbon price package has been entirely 
compatible with this expansion and has had negligible impact on the growth of 
renewables.  The AEMO report into options for a 100 per cent renewable energy 
grid estimates that 
<the cost to build a 100 per cent renewable power system is 
estimated to be at least $219 to $332 billion, depending on [sic] 
scenario. In practice, the final figure would be higher, as transition 
to a renewable power system would occur gradually, with the 
system being constructed progressively (AEMO 2013, p. 7). 
Such costs loom large over the $3.2 billion and $5 billion currently dedicated 
directly to renewable energy through ARENA and the CEFC.  It is clear that 
neither these bodies, nor the carbon price are designed to drive a full transition 
to renewable energy. 
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However, these are not negligible sums of money.  Keeping in mind the 
conflicting needs and interests of capital, and that of the state, it might be that 
this is a case of the state ‘hedging its bets’ and diversifying its energy 
capabilities to be prepared for the possibility of international action – the 
attempt of the Australian state to be a ‘relatively fast follower’ of international 
action.  This would be consistent with the government’s warning that ‚The 
world is moving and economies which do not start cleaning up now will fall 
behind‛ (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. vi). On the other hand, the 
Australian government might be under pressure from a growing fraction of 
capital in the renewables sector, or by fossil-fuel capitals who themselves want 
to ‘hedge their bets’ by diversifying into clean technology.  Alternatively, the 
funding of renewables might be motivated by concern to legitimise the 
government’s broader climate policy by pointing to outcomes.  Answers to 
these questions would add substantially to an assessment of overall state 
objectives regarding climate policy.  This is an avenue for further research, 
outside the scope of this thesis.  
 
4.4 A divided state 
Having highlighted the impact on state policy from contradictions between 
conditions of production, there is a final dimension which ought to be 
considered.  O’Connor observed that government bureaucracies are financially 
tied to strong capital growth, and thus have a structural imperative to ensure 
strong capital accumulation in order to reproduce their own existence 
(O’Connor 1973, p. 6).  States are internally divided, contain deviating interests, 
and operate as a fractured incoherent system, rather than as a single entity.  
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These two observations, combined, lead to a third contention: that the state is 
structured in such a way that some of its units can align with the agenda of 
particular fractions of capital.  The needs of some capitalist interest groups find 
allies with certain bureaucratic interests, conflicting with other state objectives. 
 
Australia has a three tiered system of government, made up of the 
Commonwealth (federal) government in addition to State governments, which 
represent the separate states and territories, and Local government (councils).  
The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) is a forum for negotiation 
between the different levels of government (DFAT 2013).  The Commonwealth 
government is divided into the legislature, executive and judiciary.  Within the 
executive (the administrative arm of government) there are currently 18 
departments and over 200 agencies listed (Australian Government Directories 
2013).  These departments and agencies are not fixed.  The Department of 
Climate Change, for example, was established in 2007 but it was transformed 
into the Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency in 2010, and then 
merged into the Department of Industry, Innovation, Climate Change, Science, 
Research and Tertiary Education (DIICCSRTE) (Clarke 2013).  It no longer 
exists.  The Commonwealth Treasury, on the other hand, has been running 
strong since it was established in January 1901.  The state-system, it can be seen, 
is precisely a series of institutions, united by certain general features and 
functions, but with highly varied tasks, levels of responsibility, jurisdictions, 
degree of authority and internal interests.  The parochial concerns of state-
governments, for instance, will differ from the national focus of the federal 
government. 
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In its submission to the Senate’s inquiry into the carbon tax (NSW Treasury 
2011), the NSW Treasury expressed strong concerns about the impact of the 
carbon tax on the Gross State Product (GSP) of NSW, and the flow-on effect this 
would have on the NSW budget.  It predicted a negative impact on GSP, due to 
a range of factors including: a reduction in dividends from NSW electricity 
generators, the reduced demand for government services (resulting from their 
higher costs as the carbon price is passed on), and ‚via its effects on the general 
economy, which in turn would affect specific state tax bases‛ (NSW Treasury 
2011, p. 12).  The submission claimed that: 
Modelling undertaken for the NSW Treasury suggests that at 
2030, the reduction in NSW GSP is the greatest of any mainland 
State, at (-)1.53 per cent.  In real terms (after adjusting for 
inflation), the loss of output in NSW is $3.7 billion a year in 2020 
rising to $9.1 billion in 2030‛ (NSW Treasury 2011, p. 8).   
In addition, according to the estimates of Macquarie Generation and Delta 
Electricity (another government coal corporation in NSW), the NSW budget 
will suffer ‚a reduction in total financial distributions (dividends and tax 
equivalents) of $45 million in 2011-12, $215 million in 2012-13, $150 million in 
2013-14 and $290 million in 2014-15‛ (NSW Treasury 2011, p. 12).  Local 
governments have benefited from the restructuring of the electricity sector not 
only from yearly dividend payments but also from large additional capital 
payments.  Chester estimated that between 1990 and 2006 ‚government 
electricity companies paid their owners at least A$34 billion in dividends, tax 
equivalents and special payments‛ (2007, p. 995) and that NSW ‚received the 
lion’s share‛ (2007, p. 995).  It is not only the regular payments on dividends 
that have benefited local government:  
In 1996, 2001 and 2003 the NSW government required substantial 
capital payments from its electricity companies in addition to 
annual dividend and tax equivalent payments. In 2001, the 
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amount of equity repaid to the NSW government was A$2410 
million (along with A$424.6 million in dividend payments) 
(Chester 2007, pp. 987-8). 
The NSW government has made considerable financial gain out of the 
restructuring process of its coal fired assets. 
 
Although Macquarie Generation is not yet fully privatised, the process of 
corporatisation has been a step in this direction and the NSW government is 
still hoping to complete the sale.  Like any firm, Macquarie Generation specifies 
its key objective is ‚focused on being a successful business and maximising the 
net worth of the State's investment in the Corporation‛ (Macquarie Generation 
2013, p. 3) and explains its intent to provide ‚The State of New South Wales 
with a predictable dividend stream and improved Shareholder value‛ 
(Macquarie Generation 2013, p. 3).  It is state-capital, and as capital it operates 
for short term competitive gain, irrespective of any broader state agenda (such 
as environmental reform).  As part of its function ‚to meet the needs of the 
Shareholders‛ (i.e. the NSW government) it ensures it will manage ‚major 
risks‛ - its number one risk is listed as ‚impact of the Carbon price regime‛ 
(Macquarie Generation 2013, pp. 3-4).   
 
What is clear is that the NSW government’s concern for its immediate financial 
needs overshadowed any longer term environmental considerations, and this 
manifested as a convergence of interests between Macquarie Generation’s 
internal profit-making interests and the interests of the NSW Treasury, 
responsible for the government’s finances.  Together they lined up to accuse the 
federal government of a ‘bias’ against Australian public ownership because 
assistance measures were set at a level too low for NSW coal-fired power 
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station to be eligible, and they have demanded a comparable share of 
‚transitional assistance‛ to that given to the private sector (NSW Treasury 2011, 
p. 14).   
 
Notably, the NSW government was even less tolerant of the RET than it was of 
the carbon tax, because it judged that the carbon tax could accommodate an 
expansion of the fossil fuel energy sector, whereas the RET posed a direct threat 
to the profitability of coal assets.  The submission argued that the Renewable 
Energy Target (RET) – a piece of ‘complimentary’ legislation that mandates that 
electricity retailers purchase 20 per cent of electricity through renewable 
sources (DE 2013) – poses a direct threat to the profitability and asset value of 
NSW government’s coal generators at Vales Point, Bayswater and Liddell 
(NSW Treasury 2011, p. 6).  This led to the NSW government calling for the RET 
to be scrapped: 
Of particular concern to NSW is that the RET has created 
significant losses of value for NSW Government-owned 
generators and is expected to lead to even more losses in the 
future.  Non-complementary measures like the RET should be 
phased out.  NSW should seek compensation for these losses, 
especially in regard to future impacts, subject to additional work 
assessing the losses of value attributable to the RET (NSW 
Treasury 2011, p. 6). 
NSW Treasurer Mike Baird went as far as to demand that if the RET was not 
phased out he would consider the option of suing the Federal Government for 
losses (Ferguson 2011). 
 
The incoherence of the state system is demonstrated by the fact that a state 
owned corporation is now in direct competition with government renewable 
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companies that the carbon price and the RET are allegedly supposed to support.  
Macquarie Generation’s (2011) statement on the impact of the carbon tax states 
that: 
The new carbon price scheme will have serious financial 
consequences for our business. < We compete in a national 
market based on our costs and how efficiently we operate the 
stations. Our competitors include more than 100 power plants in 
Queensland, NSW, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania. 
About 55% of electricity is supplied by black-coal generators, 24% 
from brown-coal, 15% from gas, 4% from Snowy Hydro and 2% 
from other renewable sources.   
The multiplicity of state interests here is not just a product of partisan 
politicking.  The previous NSW Labor government similarly expressed, though 
in more muted form, concern about value-loss to its electricity assets.  A 
submission to the CPRS Green Paper by the Rees-Labor government 
highlighting the possible risk to future investment from industries that 
‚previously invested in good faith‛ in the absence of ‘adequate’ direct 
assistance (NSW government n.d., p. 17).  Less than a year later Macquarie 
Generation and Delta Electricity submitted applications to build two new 
2000MW power stations at Bayswater and Mount Piper (Kaye 2010).  These 
assessments were granted Concept Approval by the NSW Department of 
Planning (NSW DPI 2013). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified that the Australian state’s electricity policy is 
designed to preserve the competitive benefits that come with access to fossil-
fuel resources and cheap electricity; maintain an attractive investment climate 
for future electricity needs which will primarily be met through the private 
sector; and develop a limited renewable energy sector and investigate 
85 
 
possibilities for future transition to 100 per cent renewables, but without 
providing the funds or taking the necessary steps to drive such a transition.  
The dominance of private capital in energy-intensive production, and the 
government’s need to appease private capital for its own energy security, saw it 
compensate emission-intensive electricity generators to the extent that they 
profited under the Clean Energy Plan.  This case strengthens the argument that 
under neoliberalism, when private capital becomes an intermediary between 
the state and its maintenance of the conditions of production, the difficulties of 
regulating these conditions are intensified.  These contradictions also emerge 
out of the state’s own parochial needs and internal tensions.  The NSW 
government campaigned against, and demanded compensation for, the impact 
of the carbon price on the coal-fired power stations that were one source of its 
revenue.  It is apparent that the structures and needs of the state, as well as the 
ideology of its policy makers, favour economic growth and the demands of the 
most powerful fossil fuel players over any policies that could be effective in 
reversing climate change. 
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CONCLUSION 
Captured in the policy choice of carbon pricing are the contradictory objectives 
of a capitalist state.  The Gillard government hoped that the introduction of a 
carbon tax would alleviate the ‚risks to our environment and our economy‛, 
ensure Australia did not ‚fall behind‛ international efforts to reduce emissions, 
and prove to be the ‚cheapest way to tackle climate change‛ (Commonwealth 
of Australia 2011, p. v-vi).  This thesis has applied a Marxist framework to 
argue that the carbon tax is a state-driven reform aimed at achieving all these 
objectives simultaneously, but they are ultimately irreconcilable.  Climate 
change poses a real threat to the accumulation prospects of the capitalist 
system, and this has prompted recent Australian governments to invest 
considerable financial and human resources in researching and preparing 
mitigation and adaptation strategies.  But the need to reduce emissions is, from 
the state’s perspective, only one need amongst many in its overall project of 
sustaining the conditions for accumulation.  The environmental objective has no 
priority status within the state’s agenda.  
 
Policy-making discourse within Australia and globally has viewed the 
challenge of climate change in a ‘cost-benefit’ framework.  This perspective 
gained momentum from 2006 when the Stern Review was published and, in 
Australia, the Howard government commissioned a report to investigate an 
ETS.  The understanding of climate change as a system ‘cost’ validates 
O’Connor’s argument that the degradation of the environment poses 
considerable costs for the system and the state, and this threatens capitalist 
interests.  Within this narrow cost-benefit framework the Australian state 
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desires a secure and stable climate for economic growth, but it will not sacrifice 
its neoliberal growth strategy or its fossil fuel advantage to attain it.  The 
Gillard government continued the maintenance of a corporatised and privatised 
electricity sector, and the preservation of the fossil-fuel export sector.  This led it 
to compensate highly polluting firms in the private sector which were 
competing with cleaner energy sources, even as it also put funding into the 
growth of the renewables sector through ARENA and CEFC.  The state does, 
indeed, ‚undo with one hand what it does with the other‛ (O’Connor 1998, p. 
150).   
 
In developing this perspective this thesis has drawn from literature which 
interrogates the limits of carbon pricing policies to expose the divergence 
between neoclassical theory and practice, and has utilised the insights of 
scholars who argue that carbon pricing is a way for capital to further its own 
accumulation agenda.  Building on this, O’Connor’s (1998) notion that the state 
is drawn into pursuing contradictory state objectives has been the basis for an 
account of the state that both explains its capitalist character and remains alert 
to its divergent, fractured structure, which results in different wings of the 
state-system sometimes working at cross purposes.  This analysis invites a 
reinterpretation of carbon pricing: neither a good policy ‘in-principle’, nor a 
blatant attempt by the Australian state to support capital in undermining action 
on climate change, it is rather an expression of the government wanting to have 
its cake and eat it too. 
 
Australia’s rulers are aware of the problems this poses.  The CEP itself says ‚As 
a hot and dry continent, Australia has more to lose from climate change than all 
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other developed countries‛ (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, p. vi).  At risk is 
water and food security, east-coast infrastructure, private property and the 
government’s legitimacy.  There are good reasons to take action, from the 
state’s perspective.  Even in trying to strengthen its national competitiveness 
the government had to weigh its ‘competitive advantage’ in fossil fuels and 
access to low-cost electricity against other considerations such as how to 
prepare for the possibility of other states taking climate action, how it could 
shape global climate policy for its national benefit, and how to create a situation 
of ‘business certainty’.  
 
This thesis has offered a further theoretical contribution, by arguing that the 
state’s preference for carbon pricing reflects the neoliberalisation of its 
relationship to the conditions of production.  O’Connor’s (1998, p. 149) 
delineation between different forms of state intervention provides the basis for 
this, by identifying the forms with particular historical epochs of capitalism.  
Under neoliberalism the state increasingly uses the private sector to carry out 
its functions in its governance of the conditions of production.  It continues to 
manage these conditions, but does so through the market, rather than directly.  
Carbon pricing in Australia is an example of this.  The state has intervened by 
erecting a complex bureaucratic structure to uphold a new market, within 
which private players can determine future investment.  In theory this will 
‘encourage’ business to invest in cleaner energy.  In practice business has 
carried on as before, while the government has pulled funding from at least one 
large-scale renewable project that could not source sufficient private capital.  
The neoliberalisation of the state thus appears to intensify the contradictions 
that confront it and manifest inside it. The overall outcome of these intersecting 
objectives and structural factors has seen the Australian state pursue an 
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emissions-intensive accumulation regime.  Its attempt to reconcile this with an 
accumulation strategy which can preserve the environmental condition of 
production has been unsuccessful.   
 
If the carbon tax is a product of irreconcilable state objectives, as has been 
argued, then advancing action to reverse carbon pricing and preserve the planet 
will not be achieved by reforming climate change, but only by challenging these 
state objectives in order to open up alternative forms of action.  The bridge 
between AEMO’s blueprint for a 100 per cent renewable economy and the 
creation of such an economy will not come about by unleashing the ‚genius of 
the free market‛ (Gillard 2010) but by challenging its right to rule.  Operating in 
a neoliberalised global economy, the state’s preference for an emissions-
intensive accumulation regime is structurally as well as ideologically 
reinforced.  Such a challenge can therefore not be expected to come from within 
the state itself.  But the internal divisions within the state, and the conflicting 
needs of capitalists, make them vulnerable to pressure from below.  A state 
must maintain not only accumulation conditions but its legitimacy.  A 
successful challenge to the legitimacy of the objectives which underpin the 
Australian state’s preference for carbon pricing could be the basis for advancing 
alternative forms of climate action in which capitalism’s contradictions are 
resolved in favour of a sustainable planet.   
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